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In Search of the
Ideal Intake Systf;!m
New telephone screening process helps
meet rising demands for legal aid
C
cnfronted with seemi.ngl� limitless �emand, las., Ot.tober rheLegal Aid Bureau of Umted Charities (LAB) initiated a
new telephone screenmg system to respond to inquiries and
requests for legal assistance.
Oyer the previous three years, inquiries for legal services at the downtown
crtlce rose 31 percent. from IS.810 to almost 21,000 annually. Yet under the
former "walk-in-only" intake system. individuals had to appear in person at the
downtown office and wait to be seen and advised. This resulted in over-crowded
waiting rooms and limited staff to meet the demand
"Many of the people who contact our office arc unfamiliar with lawyers
and the legal system." explained LAB director Sara Bales. "They mayor may
not qualify for the particular range of legal help we offer, but they need
assistance and do not know where 10 turn. Because cur name is familiar 10
them, and perhaps because or cur centr-alized location, they contact us in ever­
increasing numbers,"
According to Ron Fritsch,LABsuperv;sory attorneyin charge or the in­
take unit, both clients and §taff were frustrated with the former system. "Many
people had to bring their children to the officebccausc they couldn't aHorda
babysitter," Fritsch said. "Because of the volume of people coming in, and the
limilcdnum�rorprofessional$taffayailable, people often waited severat bcun
to be seen. Then, many learned that they w�re either financially ineligible or
that LAB didn't handle their type of case. Although we referred them 10 proper
invested." that hardly compensated ror tht time and travel they had already
COnflrll.lfti on pollr4
I1R. JONATHAN K BAUH, and
l1R. GEOFFREY A. FIELDS, Senior Law Student at
Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic I
Advocacy
Efforts End
Barrier to
Energy
Assistance
With the help of law
students. more low
income consumers
can now receive fuel
assistance payments
appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;
I1S. LAUREL B. RECTOR,
Assistant Attorney General,
appeared on behalf of the defendant.
L ������:b��::71�:y·1
venture between United Charities of
Chicago and the UniversityofChicaZo
Law School. used careful research and
advocacy to persuade the Illinois
Department of Commerce and Com­
munity Affairs (DCCA) to eliminate a
rule {hat prevented hundreds of low
income consumers from receiving fuel
assistance payments through the Illinois
Home EnuIY Assistance Program
(IHEAP)
In' January 1997, students in the
Clinic's Energy Assistance Project,
under the supervision of clinic attorney
Margo Ross, interview-tel a number of
cJientswhoscen('rgyassistanccapplica-
S"(I�I L"lo.kt.
I'At:tW COL .....""
The Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the
University of Chicago Law school has several summe r
positions available for first year students. The Clinic
is seeking energetic and dedicated students for these
positions.
First year law students selected for the program
will work under the close supervision of the Clinic's
attorneys and will be responsible for the legal work
done on behalf of the Clinic's clients, The summer
progam with the Clinic provides students an excellent
opprotunity to become involved in a variety of civil
legal problems that affect the poor. Currently. the
attorneys at the Clinic specialize in the areas of
employment discrimination, civil rights, public
utilities, and welfare law.
Compensation for the positions has not been set for
the upcoming summer. Students in the program last
summer received a $4.000,00 stipend for the thirteen
week program.
tionshadbec:ndenicdbecauseofanew
DCCA rule prohibiting payment of
benefits 10 applicants whose utility
serviceaccountshad�nclas$ifiedby
their utility as "self-restored." Accor­
dinglotheDCCA,lheciassification
was an attempt to discourage il'l"­
dividuals from lapping into utility
lines themselves 10 restore disconnected
Through their research, th�
students determined that the rule had
not been enacted in accordance with the
tllinois Admintnranve Procedure Act.
and violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
_ ronlifll.lrtJoflPDltl
Dean's Pagg
The Mandel
Legal Aid
Clinic
In
an address before the Legal
Club of Chicago in 1951, then­
Dean Edward H. Levi offered
a vision: "Suppose a clinic were
attached- to a university law school
which handled actual cases under the
supervision of a trained staff and
under the general guidance of the fac­
ulty of the school. It would be possible
then to take a number of students and
to have them assist in the preparation
of cases. . .. This kind of clinic could
[undertake] legal aid [and] civil liber­
ties cases.... If the work of the clinic
were of high quality, there seems little
doubt that it would fill a public need
while at the same time it would pro­
vide an opportunity for research and
training.
"
Building upon this vision, in 1959
the University of Chicago Law School
established the Edwin F. Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic to further "educational,
research, and experimental work in
the field of Legal Aid" and to create" a
model Legal Aid-Law School Clinic
program." In the almost thirty years
since its founding, the Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic has provided quality legal
service to the poor and has served as a
national leader in the field of clinical
legal education.
The Clinic today provides direct
legal advice and representation to
about 1 ,000 indigent clients each year
and serves thousands of other poor
people through class actions and other
forms of group representation. Recent
litigation projects of the Clinic have
involved racial and gender discrimina­
tion in employment, the rights of the
disabled (especially handicapped chil­
dren), and the rights of the indigent in
such diverse contexts as welfare, hous­
ing, and utilities.
Over the years, the Clinic has
shifted its emphasis away from routine,
single client representation toward
more complex forms of "impact" and
public interest litigation for the poor.
The Clinic has won several landmark
decisions in the United States
Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit, and the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Clinic's emphasis on improving
the law through legal advocacy is espe­
cially appropriate for a law school at
one of the nation's leading research
universities.
The clinical teachers include Profes- ,
sor Gary H. Palm, who serves as
Director of the Clinic, five full-time
attorneys who serve as Lecturers in'
Law or Clinical Fellows, and a profes­
sional social worker.
Approximately thirty percent of the
students at the Law School work in the
Clinic sometime during their second
or third year. The Clinic's educational
program, which extends across the sec­
ond and third years of a student's legal
education, represents the culmination
of long-standing efforts to integrate
practical legal experience with formal
legal education. Students who partici­
pate in the Clinic act not as mere
observers, but as full-fledged student
attorneys with responsibility for their
own cases, from the initial interview
through final disposition, under the
constant supervision of a full-time clin­
ical teacher.
Over the course of the two-year edu­
cational experience, the Clinic staff
plans an individualized program for
each student. In the fall and winter
quarters of the second year of law
school, students concentrate on
research, legal writing, drafting, inter-
vIewmg, counseling, negotiation,
informal advocacy, preparation of
briefs, and the responsibilities of a trial
assistant. In the spring quarter of the
second year, students participating in
the Clinic may enroll in the Litigation
Methods course. This course, which
extends over four quarters, is taught by
members of the Clinic staff and carries
six hours of academic credit.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 711
authorizes third-year students partici­
pating in the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic
to appear in state courts on behalf of
clients. Thus, the third-year program
provides each student with the oppor­
tunity to represent clients individually
and to learn trial skills and strategies.
The Litigation Methods course, which
operates in close coordination with on­
going litigation, serves as a continuous
planning session as each student pre­
pares for actual court appearances in a
range of different matters.
The Mandel Legal Aid Clinic,
which receives approximately 18 per­
cent of its funding from United Chari­
ties of Chicago, 15 percent from
government grants and attorneys' fees,
and 65 percent from the Law School
and its alumni, plays a pivotal role in
enabling the Law School to meet its
educational and public service respon­
sibilities. The Clinic fulfills Edward
Levi's vision.
?�/�
Geoffrey R. Stone
Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law
Dean of the Law School
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A Worthy Tradition:
Freedom of Speech in America
January 27, 1988, marked the publica­
tion of the late Professor Harry Kalven
Jr. 's great essay on the First Amend­
ment, A VVtJrtfry Tradition: Freedom of
Speech in America. The book was com­
pleted and edited for publication by
Professor Kalven's son, Jamie. We
offer you here a taste of the work, in
the form of edited extracts. The pas­
sages in italics are fromJamie Kalven's
introduction.
Harry KalvenJr. G.D. '38), Harry A.
Bigelow Professor of Law, taught
courses on the First Amendment and
torts at the Law School from 1946 to
his death in 1974. His classes were
lively discussions on freedom of
speech ..Both in his writings and as a
lawyer he defended individuals who
were victims of official repression
because of their political views and
associations.
This article is taken from the book A
Wortfry Tradition: Freedom of Speech
America by Harry Kalven, Jr., edited
by Jamie Kalven. Copyright © 1988
by Jamie Kalven, Reprinted by per­
mission of Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc.
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Harry Kalven, Jr.
"
Whatever
else it mayor may not be, it is turning out to be the book I always wanted
to write. )) Ifind these words in a letterfrom myfather dated September 1, 1973.
Mailedfrom a vacation cottage on Martha's Vineyard, the letter crackles with
characteristic gaiety:
I spent thefirstfour weeks here post-sunrise slowly carefully rereading my 800 pages of
manuscript and doing some shuffling of pieces. The news is that I found it just
swell!. .. I am now clear that the effort to document a tradition is sound, especiallyfor
this tradition. Arryway I now estimate, I'm still 600 pages away from completion
(but I can almost touch the end).... Now all I need to do is to get [my] editors ... out
here to read it amidst swans, rabbits, and egrets! I'm promised Fall 1974 off, and
with the six months starting next June, really hope to bring it to a close. Mother, I
should add, liked all the marry passages I read aloud to her!
The manuscript on which my father was working with such appetite was an essay on the
American constitutional experience under the First Amendment .... Conceived early in his career,
it had long been deferred while he worked on other things....
Finally in 1970 he cleared his desk ofother commitments and set to work on the book he had
"aluiays wanted to write. " His plan was to pull together in one place the analyses of various
problems he had developed over theyears in scattered articles and in class. He aspired to survey the
entire corpus of the Supreme Court's work on issues offreedom ofspeech and association. To get it
all into a single book. To see it whole....
Then, in thefall of1974, at his desk, working on the manuscript, he died. He was sixtyyears
old. He bequeathed an unfinishedfirst draft of over a thousand pages heavily embroidered with
marginalia. This manuscript posed a dilemma to which there could be nofully satisfactory solu­
tion. Unpublishable in the form he left it, it was too good to put aside, too precious to cede to
death. . .. I have edited and, where necessary, supplemented the manuscript. This book is the
product of that effort: n-ry father's manuscript conveyed to the reader by other hands....
[Harry Kalven once observed that thefreedom of} "speech. is (almost an absolute'-that is, it
is highly unlikely in any instance that the argument v. regulation will win but that this is not an
a priori conclusion known in advance of the concrete challenge but a result to be won by sweat in
the individual case, time after time!
')
How much hangs on that "almost"! Ifyou believefreedom ofspeech an absolute, yo¥- can state
your position in a sentence. Believing it "almost an absolute) " [he] was moved to write this
book. ... For, as he sees it, the dialogue between the society and the Court over the meaning ojfree­
dom of speech is not simply a succession of occasions for declaring an absolute. Nor is it only a
means to the end ofa general theory. It is) above all) an end in itself: a discipline offreedom) the
ongoing work of a free society.
The Hostile Audience: Terminiello
Father Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, was a
spokesman for the anti-Semitic, fascist faction in American
life during the late 1940s associated with such names as
Father Coughlin and Gerald L. K. Smith. He was a profes­
sional rabble-rouser. The case arose as a result of a public
speech he gave at an auditorium in Chicago. Advertisement
of the event had aroused widespread resentment, and by the
time he rose to speak to an audience of eight hundred, there
was a police cordon around the auditorium. A hostile crowd
of at least a thousand milled around outside, .and there were
sporadic episodes of brick throwing and other violence. In
this tense setting Terminiello gave a speech which, though it
had a surface restraint, was rich in horror stories about what
some Jewish doctors had done to German war prisoners and
was dotted with remarks such as: "That's what they want
for you, that howling mob outside"; "Some of the scum got
in by mistake"; "Why should we tolerate them?"; "We
don't want them here, we want them to go back where they
came from .... " For making the speech Terminiello was
charged with disorderly conduct under the Chicago breach
of peace ordinance and was fined $100 ....
The Court was thus directly confronted with the critical
issue of ideological fighting words in the context of an explo­
sive fact situation. Speaking through Justice Douglas, the
five-man majority reversed the conviction on constitutional
grounds, but did so in a way that side-stepped the issue so
boldly presented by the facts. "We do not reach that ques­
tion," Justice Douglas stated at the outset, "for there is a
preliminary question that is dispositive of the case." The
preliminary question was an error discovered in the instruc­
tions the trial judge had given the jury, an error which had
not been argued by the defendant below and was put for­
ward by the Supreme Court on its own motion ....
Justice Jackson's dissent is a twenty-five page essay which
deserves to be read in its own right. [H]is anger and elo­
quence force a sobering realization of how high the stakes
are in cases of this genre. Jackson emphasizes the facts. He
evokes the unrest around the auditorium when Terminiello
rose to speak and quotes the speech extensively. He sees this
episode as part of a larger extremist strategy of "fighting for
the streets" as a first step toward revolution. Since instances
of calculated disorder like this one will, as he sees it, arise
steadily given the brutal political struggles afoot in the
world, he would permit the police to stop and if necessary
arrest the speaker when in their judgment the speech carries
a considerable risk of disorder....
Whatever our gratitude to Jackson for properly sobering
the issue, there are several great difficulties with his reaction
to the Terminiello facts. The content of Terminiello's speech
was not in itself within the reach of the law. Had it been
written, it would have raised little question. Also, his
remarks, however offensive to those outside, were not fight­
ing words to the audience he was addressing within the hall.
Hence even if the fighting words doctrine were extended to
ideological insults, it would have no bearing on these facts.
Finally, the problem of disorder is precipitated exclusively
by the hostility of the mob outside. This is not a speech on a
street corner; it IS in a hall. There is no shadow of a captive
audience problem present. The mob outside is attemptmg
censorship by the naked exercise of physical force.
Father Arthur Terminiello (I.) with Gerald L. K. Smith (r.).
The problem is tough, and one must sympathize with the
police, but the rule selected may set the tenor of the society.
While it makes sense to "take men as they are" in recogniz­
ing and penalizing the risks involved in uttering fighting
words intending to insult, it makes profoundly less sense to
"take men as they are" with respect to the risks involved in
uttering offensive ideas. It is difficult to see that form of
moral outrage as a fact oflife which the law must accommo­
date. In the end, Justice Jackson's argument in Terminiello
seems to rest on the reaction of the hostile audience what­
ever the merits of the audience's views; it is the fact of their
reaction that tips the balance against speech. But it seems to
me that sometimes even when the danger of disorder is
high, the society must protect the speaker and insist that the
audience endure the offense of an unpleasant idea.
Subversive Advocacy: Abrams
There was, to be sure, plenty in Abrams to stir indignation.
Decided on November 10, 1919, it arose under legislation
which differs from that in Schenck and Debs. [In Schenck and
Debs, which were decided several months before Abrams, the
Court upheld the convictions under the Espionage Act of
1917 of individuals who had opposed World War I and the
draft. It was in Schenck that Justice Holmes, writing for a
unanimous Court, first used the phrase "clear and present
danger." Abrams involved a prosecution under the Sedition
Act of 1918 which, among other things, prohibited any per­
son "to urge ... curtailment of production of things ... neces-
sary... to the prosecution of the war."]
,
Abrams and his associates, RussianJewish emigres living
in New York, were self-styled "rebels," "revolutionists,"
and" anarchists." They participated in the printing of some
five thousand leaflets condemning the United States for
sending troops into Russia following the revolution and call­
ing for a general strike of workers in munitions factories.
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Perhaps the most telling fact is that some of the leaflets were
distributed by dropping them out of a window. [Professor
Zechariah] Chafee has left an indelible account of the con­
duct of the trial which shows it to have been a scandal-a
political trial of the defendants for the excesses of the Rus­
sian Revolution.
Speaking through Justice Clarke, the majority of the
Supreme Court affirms the convictions in an opinion
which ... disposes of the First Amendment challenge in two
sentences, [concluding that] "this contention is ... definitely
negatived in Schenck. "
Justice Holmes, the author of Schenck, dissents, joined by
Justice Brandeis. His opinion is the most sustained state­
ment he is ever to make on free speech .... [In] Holmes's
opinion ... is found the effective birth of the American tradi­
tion of freedom of speech .... He is indignant at the twenty­
year sentences imposed on the defendants for such an
abortive, well-intentioned, trivial, radical effort:
Even if I am technically wrong and enough can be
squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn
the color of legal litmus paper; ... the most nominal
punishment seems to me all that possibly could be
inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer
not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed they
avow-a creed that I believe to be the creed of ignorance
and immaturity when honestly held, as I see no reason to
doubt that it was held here, but which, although made the
subject of examination at the trial, no one has a right even
to consider in dealing with the charges before the Court.
There then follows the famous peroration which
alchemizes the muddled opinion into durable gold:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result with all your heart
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away
all opposition .... But when men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not
every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the
law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.... I regret that I cannot put into more impressive
words my belief that in their conviction upon this
indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights
under the Consti'tution of the United States.
This statement, although durably eloquent and a won­
derful gesture of passion by the seventy-nine year-old jus­
tice, is puzzling, If the First Amendment is this stringent,
then how is one to explain the decisions in Schenck and Debs
[which had upheld convictions in circumstances quite simi­
lar to those in Abrams]? .. One cannot be altogether sure,
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but my strong impression is that the great peroration is
addressed not to the precise charge against the defendants
but to the broad issue of persecuting a man for his radical
opinions or creed. In realists' terms, it is addressed to the
submerged issue ofAbrams-it was a political trial of Bolshe­
viks. In the peroration, liberated from the precise issues of
the case and no longer fussing about intent, Holmes can
deal with free speech policy in great broad strokes ....
Justice Holmes's splendid indignation over the shabby
draconian treatment of the radicals in Abrams, whom he saw
as distributors of "these poor and puny anonymities," sup­
plies a blood transfusion for the Schenck dictum. [The] strat­
egy is ... to read the burst of eloquence at the end of the
Abrams dissent into the casual Schenck dictum and then to
claim that it was there all the time, that it was this intense
commitment to a stringent test for freedom of speech that
the whole Court underwrote in Schenck. And in a curious
extra-precedential way it works. Although the [clear and
present danger] test is virtually ignored by the majority
after Schenck, it comes to acquire enormous prestige. The
process of evolution from Schenck to Abrams, and ultimately
to Brandenburg [the Court's most recent statement ofthe lim­
its of permissible advocacy], has indeed been a mysterious
and instructive one showing that the First Amendment has
a charisma that sets it apart from other rules and principles
of law.
Samuel Lipman, Hyman Lachowsky, Mollie Steimer, and
Jacob Abrams at the time of their deportation, 1921.
Subversive Advocacy: Whitney
The statute under which Miss Whitney was convicted made
it a felony to knowingly become a member of"any organi­
zation, .. assembled to advocate ... criminal syndicalism." It
defined "criminal syndicalism" as "the commission of cri­
me ... as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or. .. effecting any political change.... "
Whitnry arose out of the splintering of the American
Socialist Party. Miss Whitney, who had joined the more
"radical" Communist Labor Party, attended a meeting at
which a California branch of the party was organized....
Whitnry [which was decided in 1925] put into issue the con­
stitutionality of using criminal sanctions to penalize advo­
cacy of terrorism ....
The majority... requires only a page and a half to dispose
of the free speech issue. The opinion by Justice Sanford
indicates ... how little the clear and present danger test
means to the majority at this time. Sanford does not refer to
it; he relies on a strong presumption of the constitutionality
of the statute; and he refers to utterances which tend "to
incite to crime" and to "endanger the foundations of orga­
nized government." Although there is no proof in the
record that the advocacy with which Miss Whitney was
charged created a high degree of danger, the majority dis­
misses such a consideration as immaterial. In its view, advo­
cating the syndicalist doctrine of selective violence is
enough.
Justice Brandeis, in an opinion joined by Justice Holmes,
launches an eloquent protest against the bland analysis of
the majority opinion. In durable rhetoric he explores the
policy basis of our commitment to free speech and analyzes
with care when, in light of that policy, a danger can be said
to be imminent enough and serious enough to warrant
restriction.
Although Whitney marks the sixth consecutive decision in
which the majority has either ignored the clear and present
danger test or found it inapplicable, Justice Brandeis asserts
at the outset:
That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction
does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended
to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some
substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek
to prevent has been settled. See Schenck v. United States.
The stamina and tactics of these classic dissents are
remarkable. In professional lawyering terms, the perform­
ance of Justices Holmes and Brandeis is outrageous. They
keep insisting that they are adhering to the Court's true rule
adopted in Schenck. They have been told by the majority that
clear and present danger is not now and never was the gen­
eral test and that it is applicable only in cases where speech
is punished under statutes aimed at acts. They have conve­
niently forgotten Debs) and, in the face of the majority's
skepticism, they have never paused to explain how Schenck
itself comported with the test. Yet we are all deeply in their
debt for their outrageous behavior. They have kept alive a
counter-tension in the tradition, and their towering prestige
has invested the slogan with almost mesmerizing force. Like
twin Moses come down from Mount Sinai bearing the true
Commandment, they see little need to argue that the for­
mula is rightly derived from the First Amendment, merely
that it is ....
Brandeis begins his exegesis of the clear and present dan-
ger standard by posing a series of questions:
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to
determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how
remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present; and
what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial
to justify resort to abridgement of free speech and
assembly as the means of protection.
The agenda is to prove a splendid one. But how extraor­
dinary to say that the Court has "not yet" attended to
resolving ambiguities in the test, when the Court has so
steadfastly refused to grant the test the status Holmes and
Brandeis claim for it. It is the two dissenters who have not
yet determined these features of their formula.
Before answering his three questions about the test, Jus­
tice Brandeis pauses to examine the underlying policy
which dictates such stringent control over the regulation of
speech. The passage is quite wonderful:
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.
... With these grand premises made explicit, Justice
Brandeis turns to the question of how clear and present the
danger must be:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt
women. It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one.
... There is plausibility to the clear and present danger
test as Justice Brandeis derives it from the basic architecture
of American values. The point is simple: Freedom of speech
is so essential to the American way of life and thought, and
confidence in its power is so deep, that only an extraordi­
nary threat to the safety of the community justifies depart­
ing from those expectations by employing the law to coerce
silence ....
Justice Brandeis was seventy-one years old when he wrote
his remarkable opinion; Justice Holmes was seventy-nine
years old when he wrote his eloquent peroration in Abrams;
Alexander Meiklejohn was seventy-eight years old when he
wrote his stirring essay on free speech. It is the mark of the
topic that it recruits such distilled wisdom from the con­
cerned elders of the society, and it is the special blessing of
the American heritage that it has had such elders to rise and
speak.
Freedom of Association: The SACB Case
Cases can come to the Court at the wrong time. In the area
of First Amendment law the supreme example of a case out
of its proper time is Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board, decided in 1961.
.
SACB should have been the architectonic case for freedom
of association. It involved a complex government strategy­
the Subversive Activities Control Act-that was explicitly
aimed at sanctioning association .... It was the paradigm of
the anti-Communist legal strategies which had dominated
the 1940s and 1950s. It was in a real sense the major govern-
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ment attack on Communism in the United States and hence
a political development of high import. And it evoked some
212 pages of opinions from the justices. Yet it comes too late.
As the Court goes through its elaborate reasonings, there is
the sense that no one is listening any longer. [SAGB] invites
relatively little commentary and today plays only a minor
role in the casebooks on which lawyers are trained. It is
treated as outside the mainstream of First Amendment
precedent; it involved legislation so specifically tailored to
hit the Communist Party that it seems to have been thought
of as limited to that one question. Hence, as the Communist
issue has receded, so too has the salience ofSAGE. ... Yet it is
quite possibly the precedent which carries the greatest
threat to political freedoms in the future. Any effort to map
the work of the Court in building a tradition around the
First Amendment must allow it a central place....
[One of the many issues posed by SAGB was triggered by
the Act's requirement that, to demonstrate that an organi­
zation was a "Communist-front" organization, and thus
covered by the Act, the government had] to show that the
organization was under the control and domination of "the
foreign government controlling the world Communist
movement." One line of proof authorized by the Act was
consideration of "the extent to which its views and policies
do not deviate" from those of that foreign government. In
brief, the Act made official use of the logic that Senator
Joseph McCarthy had employed so vigorously, namely, test­
ing the loyalty of a person by tracing the number of public
issues on which his views coincide with those of the Soviet
Union. In the gross form used by McCarthy it was enough
to kill any position to show that the Soviets had endorsed it.
Its use in the SAGB case was far more circumspect and
rational. The Government put on an expert witness, Dr.
Moseley of Columbia University, who testified that he had
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examined the position of the Party on forty-five major inter­
national issues over thirty years and had found no substan­
tial deviation between the Party position and that taken by
the Soviet Union.
The Party challenged this line of proof [on the ground
that] the Board had refused to let the Party introduce evi­
dence to show that many non-Communists shared the views
of the Party and the Soviets on particular issues. [Writing
for the Court], Justice Frankfurter responds by arguing that
the inference of foreign control from such a pattern of paral­
lelism was rational and that the Board was not required to
hear the Party's evidence in rebuttal. ... The Court thus rat­
ified, without even seeming to be aware of it, a devastating
technique for chilling discussion of public issues. It gave the
Communist Party the power to capture any public issue it
wished simply by embracing one side of it. The Govern­
ment was announcing publicly that the way to stay out of
trouble was to avoid taking the Soviet side of any public
issue on which the Soviet Union had expressed an
opinion ....
The point does not really depend upon whether, if the
sample is good enough and the coincidence of views is high
enough, an inference of non-independent thinking or worse
may logically be ascribed to the group. It is rather that such
a line of proof can never be worth what the legal system
must pay for it in First Amendment values. It is difficult to
think of any step more miseducating of public tolerance,
more in contradiction of the traditions of the First Amend­
ment, than this. It is a scandal that it passes unnoticed in the
two hundred pages of judicial opinion in SAGE. ...
In the end, the solemn opening ofJustice Black's dissent
remains the fitting last word on the case:
The first banning of an association because it advocates
hated ideas-whether that association be called a political
party or not-marks a fateful moment in the history of a
free country. That moment seems to have arrived for this
country.
Partial Sanctions: Eljbrandt
The classic sanction for speech, prior licensing apart, has
been the criminal sanction. Its purpose is to prevent the
publishing of the disfavored message; it has no other pur­
pose than to dissuade the weaker from saying that. In con­
trast' there is another set of situations, in which only a
privilege of some sort is at stake, and the state objective­
and motivation-may be highly ambiguous.
A sufficient illustration is provided by Justice Holmes's
bon mot in the McAuliffe case in 1892, back in the days when
he was on the Massachusetts Supreme Court. McAuliffe
had been fired by the city of New Bedford for violating a
municipal regulation limiting the political activities of poli­
cemen. In an opinion upholding the dismissal, Holmes
observed: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police­
man." Viewed from one perspective, depriving a man of a
job because the state does not like a speech he has made is a
powerful form of censorship, possibly more painful and
effective than a criminal fine. From another perspective,
however, it may not represent the pursuit of censorship but
the pursuit of some other objective with respect to public
employment. Moreover, although Justice Holmes was too
simplistic in his wit, he did have an insight. The sanction in
such a case is partial. The state is not making an effort to
prevent the speech altogether; the speaker can continue to
speak, albeit at the cost of his job; and if someone else makes
the same speech, the state need not intervene ....
The linking of the partial sanction problem with the
evolving norms for direct sanctions comes in Eifbrandt v.
Russell in 1966. This decision is the most important prece­
dent the Court has yet rendered on the loyalty oath and is a
key precedent on partial sanctions in general. ...
[In Eifbrandt, the Court invalidated an Arizona statute
requiring every public employee to take an oath that he was
not a member of the Communist Party or of any organiza­
tion "having for one of its purposes" the violent overthrow
of the government.] As I read Justice Douglas's opinion,
they conclude that the oath is overbroad because it does not
contain the limitations on membership in subversive organ­
izations imposed in Scales as a predicate for the imposition of
criminal sanctions:
We recognized in Scales v. United States that "quasi-political
parties or other groups ... may embrace both legal and
illegal aims." We noted that a "blanket prohibition of
association with a group having both legal and illegal
aims" would pose "a real danger that legitimate political
expression or association would be impaired.
" The statute
with which we dealt in Scales, the so-called "membership
clause" of the Smith Act, was found not to suffer from this
constitutional infirmity because, as the Court construed
it, the statute reached only "active" membership with the
"specific intent" of assisting in achieving the unlawful
ends of the organization.
The Arizona oath then is bad because it meets only one of
the three limitations imposed in Scales: knowledge is
required, but not active membership and specific intent.
Justice Douglas is thus on the brink of a major point,
namely, that partial sanctions touching First Amendment
freedoms are presumptively governed by the same strict cri­
teria that apply to direct sanctions touching such freedoms.
Regrettably, he does not make the point explicit; and thus a
fundamental clarification of a large part of the contempo­
rary First Amendment business of the Court is not publicly
achieved. Yet the conclusion is securely implicit in the hold­
ing of the Court.
Although Justice Douglas does not meet the issue as
openly and explicitly as he might have, his opinion is
instinct with a major insight. He quotes with discrimination
from the Harlan opinion in Scales and fully exploits Harlan's
acknowledgement that quasi-political groups differ from
conventional criminal conspiracies in one important
respect: They do not have a single unifying criminal pur­
pose, but rather share "both legal and illegal aims." There
is, therefore, in the careful Scales analysis precedent for
worry about the impact on freedom of association when
anything less than literal conspiracy is used by the law to
impute "guilt." Douglas argues that the same cautions are
relevant when we shift to government employment. The
crucial sentence in his opinion reads: "Those who join an
organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and
who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose
no threat, either as citizens or as public employees.
)) To reach
"the citizen" with constitutional precision, Justice Harlan
argued in Scales, required that the law establish his nexus to
the evil purpose of the group by the three fold ties of knowl­
edge, activity, and evil intent. Justice Douglas is simply
asserting that the same precision in establishing the nexus is
required when the law seeks to withdraw privileges from
"the public employee." Otherwise-although he does not
spell out this step in the logic-the relation of the employ­
ment regulation "to the evil apprehended" is not
reasonable.
The counter-argument of course is that, since we are here
regulating employment and not imposing criminal sanc­
tions, the precision need not be so great. There is a rational
likelihood that persons who belong to criminal organiza­
tions with knowledge of their evil purposes will be unfaithful
employees. The issue before the Court is not the imputation
of criminal guilt; it is merely the imputation of employee
unreliability.
What is at stake is whether the risk calculus of the pru­
dent employer is not in a radical sense at war with the nor­
mal regard we have for the value and sensitivity of First
Amendment freedoms. The calculus is by its nature proba­
bilistic; it is not that this individual has done something
wrong, but that actuarially speaking he carries a higher risk
of auto accident. The actuary always imputes guilt by asso­
ciation. But respect for the air of freedom in the United
States requires that the government as employer live
dangerously.
Deportation: Carlson
The use of exile or banishment as a sanction ... is unknown
in modern democratic states and would presumably be
unconstitutional in the United States. Hence, even during
the height of the anti-Communist decades, the courts were
never asked to confront directly, with respect to American
citizens, the legal status of exile as a sanction.
Such was not the case, however, with respect to resident
aliens. As applied to them, exile as an anti-subversive strat-
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egy flourished. It took the form of deportation-the with­
drawal of the privilege of residing in the United States­
and it generated a number of Supreme Court decisions.
These cases are revealing as social history and as evidence of
the mood of the times. Above all, they are revealing as illus­
trations of how the government may act to reduce the risk of
subversion when unrestrained by the Constitution....
Carlson v. Landon in 1952 ... presents the question of
whether the petitioners have a right to bail pending a final
determination of their deportability. The deportation provi­
sions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 provided that the
Attorney General had discretion to grant bail. The issue in
Carlson is just how broad that discretion is, Might the Attor­
ney General withhold bail on nothing more than reason to
believe the deportees were present members of the Party,
without any individualizing evidence as to the distinctive
risks they would offer if released on bail until deported?
. . . By a vote of 5 to 4, the Court affirms the power of the
Attorney General to detain deportees without bail on the
ground of present membership in the Communist Party.
The majority... makes no effort to minimize the harshness
of the result. Justice Reed acknowledges that, Party mem­
bership apart, the petitioners have behaved impeccably dur­
ing their long residence in America. Indeed, it is noted that
one of them had two sons who served in the Army in World
War II, and had himself sold $50,000 in war bonds and
given blood to the Red Cross on many occasions ....
Justice Reed avoids confronting head-on the.question of
whether there are any due process restraints operative in
deportation. He accepts the government position that the
test under the statute is whether there was an abuse of dis­
cretion. It was, he thinks, "reasonable" for the Attorney
General to conclude that membership itself made alleged
Communist aliens too unreliable to release on bail pending
a determination of their status and deportability....
The four dissents each reflect an emphasis characteristic
of the style of the particular justice.... The centerpieces of
the dissent are the opinions of Justices Frankfurter and
Black. Justice Frankfurter in a superb technical opinion
destroys the majority's reading of the Act .... [H]e stresses
that. .. the granting ofbail has traditionally been understood
to depend on individuating circumstances as to the particu­
lar defendant. Thus the Act in giving the Attorney General
discretion to grant or withhold bail must have �ntended the
traditional mode of such discretion and that in turn meant
keying the discretion to the individuating facts about the
particular individual. This the Attorney General had clearly
not done; rather, he had placed a blanket ban on all mem­
bers of the Communist Party.
. . . Characteristically, Black's ultimate eloquence is
stirred by his perception of this technical controversy over
bail as a grave affront to First Amendment values. As he
sees it, the case is an instance ofpre-trial detention jor speech....
Black quotes the District Judge, who conceded that "there is
nothing here to indicate the Government is fearful that they
are going to leave the jurisdiction" and then justified his
denial of bail by telling counsel: "I am not going to turn
these people loose if they are Communists, any more than I
would turn loose a deadly germ in this community." Bad as
convicting people after trial for speech crimes may be, it is
singularly offensive in Justice Black's eyes to detain them
before trial because of the danger of their speech:
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The stark fact is that if Congress can authorize im­
prisonment of" alien Communists" because dangerous, it
can authorize imprisonment of citizen "Communists" on
the same ground. And while this particular [Bureau of
Immigration] campaign to fill the jails is said to be aimed
at "dangerous" alien Communists only, peaceful citizens
may be ensnared in the process .... [The] basis of holding
these people in jail is a fear that they may indoctrinate
people with Communist beliefs. To put people in jail for
fear of their talk seems to me an abridgement of speech in
flat violation of the First Amendment. ... My belief is that
we must have freedom of speech, press and religion for all
or we may eventually have it for none .... [This] freedom is
too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit.
But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment
weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship
and deliberately chose the First Amendment's
unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition,
speech and press shall not be abridged .
Carlson) then, although it involves only a detail about the
procedures for bail in deportation cases, is informed by the
fundamental tensions which characterize First Amendment
controversies where national security is the countervalue.
Its denial of bail is another example, to be placed alongside
the denial of Social Security benefits in Flemming v. Nestor
and the denial of the right to practice before the Supreme
Court in In re Isserman, of a pettiness, a meanness of spirit,
which in the end infects government anti-subversion efforts.
And in each instance the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
make the small correction is disheartening.
Ignatz Mezei, "man without a country JJ
Exclusion: Mezei
Shaughnessy o. United States ex rel Mezei [was] a decision the
absurdity and intolerance of which is caught and preserved
forever in a classic dissent by Justice Jackson. Mezei had
come to the United States in 1923 and resided here for the
next twenty-five years until in 1948, leaving his wife and
home, he went to Rumania to visit his dying mother. Due to
some difficulties both in getting into Rumania and in get­
ting out again, Mezei did not return to the United States
until nineteen months later. He was denied entry and
denied a hearing by the Attorney General on the basis of
information the disclosure of which, under-the familiar for­
mula, would be "prejudicial to the public interest....
"
Having been denied entry, Mezei was temporarily
detained at Ellis Island pending the completion of arrange­
ments to return him to some suitable foreign country. But
all efforts to persuade another country to accept him proved
unsuccessful and after twenty-one months he was still
detained on Ellis Island. At this point he brought habeas
corpus to force his release on bail pending arrangements for
departure. It is this exquisitely narrow issue about bail
under these very special facts that the Court is asked to
decide. The case thus poses [the issue] whether this pro­
longed detention is supportable without some minimal pro­
cedural due process being afforded Mezei.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals decide
the bail issue in Mezei's favor, but the Supreme Court in a 5
to 4 decision-over the dissents ofJustices Jackson, Frank­
furter, Black, and Douglas-finds it necessary to reverse
and to return Mezei to Ellis Island ....
Justice Jackson, in a dissent joined by Justice Frank­
furter, is incredulous at the outcome.... For Justice Jackson
it is the prolonged detention that generates constitutional
limitations on the official action. The realism which had
moved him to indignation over the Court's tolerance of pro­
vocative speech in the public forum in Terminiello ... now
with splendid evenhandedness moves him to equal indigna­
tion over his government's relentless pursuit of security in
Mezei. His performance is a reminder of two important
characteristics of a great judge: a capacity for anger-a
sense of justice and a capacity for indignation are not
unconnected-and a capacity for realism as to the actual
outcome of the case before him. These are difficult judicial
virtues indeed; an excess of one leads to bias, an excess of
the other to the destruction of any rule of law.
He writes ... :
This man, who seems to have led a life of unrelieved
insignificance, must have been astonished to find himself
suddenly putting the Government of the United States in
such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of
him.
The Jackson dissent is an eloquent expression of what is
for him and Justice Frankfurter the central value of a civi­
lized society. Even more than freedom of speech and associ­
ation, it is adherence to procedural due process.... The
indefinite confinement is especially offensive to Jackson, so
recently returned from the Nuremberg Trials, because it
carries "unmistakable overtones" of the protective custody
of the Nazis. His parting shot, as he closes his dissent, might
well stand as the epitaph for this entire section of the Court's
work:
I have not been one to discount the Communist evil. But
my apprehensions about the security of our form of
government are about equally aroused by those who refuse
to acknowledge the dangers of Communism and those
who will not see danger in anything else.
The judicial statesman works at the edge of a future he does not
know. So does the writer. Reading rrry father's essay today) we know
something of thefuture into which he spoke. In some respects the pas­
sage of time has undermined his words; in others it has conferredpower
upon them; and it has sharpened his questions about the relationship of
law and tradition. Happily) it has also deepened the sense in which
this book about tradition embodies tradition.' That which survives is
sustaining: the companionship of his lively) passionate) interested
voice speaking to us) out of the past) in the present tense. •
At bookstores everywhere, or
USE OUR TOLL-FREE NUMBER
FOR EASY ORDERING
1-800-638-3030
"A marvelous work that resonates with deep thought
and graceful prose ... the legal mind at its best."
-Los Angeles Times
"Legal scholarship on a grand scale." -Kirkus Reviews
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The
nominations of Robert
Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, and
Anthony Kennedy to fill the
seat of retiring Supreme Court Justice
Lewis Powell have drawn attention,
much of it ill informed and misleading,
to the character of conservative legal
thought. Expecting to find a right­
wing monolith, senators and other
observers have instead been puzzled by
the differences among legal thinkers on
the right. Sometimes they have been
surprised even by differences within
the thought of a single conservative, as
with Robert Bork's intellectual odyssey
from libertarianism, through law and
economics, to his mature espousal of
democratic traditionalism. It often
seems that debates among the various
perspectives on the right-not debates
between right and left-raise the most
vital questions regarding the founda­
tions of American constitutionalism.
Traditional jurisprudential conser­
vatives, with their focus on judicial
restraint; libertarians, with their com­
mitment to individual liberties and
hostility to big government; the law
and economics movement, with its rig­
orous pursuit of economic efficiency;
and social conservatives, with their
loyalty to community and traditional
moral values-each of these schools of
thought has developed a distinct set of
legal principles. Each is a challenge
and a threat to the still-dominant lib­
eral orthodoxy; each has an uneasy
relation with its allies on the right.
Taken together, these schools of
thought seek to redirect constitutional
discourse toward the genuine issues of
democracy, liberty, and the rule of law,
which were so often neglected in the
last decades' rush to use the courts to
circumvent a political system per­
ceived as resistant to social change.
Consider the subjects of legal con­
troversy. Ten years ago the law reviews
were filled with speculations about
how to use the Constitution to expand
welfare "rights," end capital punish­
ment, and uproot traditional sexual
mores. Today you are more likely to
see symposia devoted to such questions
as: the weight that should be given the
original intention of the framers of the
Constitution, the extent to which eco­
nomic liberties should be protected by
law, and the means by which moral
(even religious) values in public life
can be preserved.
So powerful has been the advance of
conservative legal theory that we have
seen a virtual reversal of roles in the
legal debate. Now it is the left that
cherishes stasis and precedent-that is
fighting a rear guard action against
change. Joseph Biden's Judiciary
Committee treated the Burger Court
as the pinnacle of constitutional wis­
dom, and any criticism of the Court's
decisions as a sign that the nominee
was dangerously outside the "main­
stream." That defensive posture, as
much as anything, is evidence of the
direction of movement in the legal
debate.
So powerful has been the
.
advance ojconservative
legal theory that we have
seen a virtual reversal of
roles in the legal debate.
Traditional Conservatism
Two principles form the heart, and the
common element, of conservative legal
theory. First is commitment to the rule
oflaw. Legal action and decisions must
be grounded in neutral principles of
general applicability. Constitutional
principles do not change with the polit­
ical climate; the task of judges, to the
extent possible, is to discern what the
law is, not to advance their policy pref­
erences. The second principle is a
democratic adherence to the consent of
the governed. The legitimacy of our
laws, including our Constitution,
arises from the deliberate decisions of
the people, made through their repre­
sentative institutions. Laws, including
the Constitution, must therefore be
read, to the extent possible, as embo­
dying the intentions of the people who
adopted them rather than the opinions
of those who, hold judicial office today.
Restoring the proper relation
between unelected courts and the
elected representatives of the people is
the foremost concern of traditional
legal conservatives, exemplified by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Attorney General Edwin Meese
III. The central question is how to
read the Constitution of the United
States. Is the Constitution, as some
contend, an elastic and indefinite doc­
ument that licenses judges-in the
words ofJustice Hugo Black-to "sub­
stitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment oflegislative bodies"?
Or does it have some fixed, reasonably
ascertainable meaning, which con­
strains both legislatures and judges?
Traditional conservatives contend
that the Constitution is principally a
framework for democratic decision­
making and not a blueprint for specific
social and economic policies. Outside
of a few important, well-defined per­
sonal liberties set forth in the docu­
ment, the Constitution allows the
people to make public policy through
their elected representatives. When the
Court ventures into policymaking in
the guise of constitutional interpreta­
tion, it oversteps the role assigned to it
under the Constitution.
In response to the liberals' open­
ended view of constitutional interpre­
tation, traditional conservatives have
articulated an "interpretivist" theory,
dubbed by Attorney General Meese
the "Jurisprudence of Original
Intent." According to the interpretivist
view, when the text and structure of
the Constitution leaves room for doubt
about its meaning, it should be read in
light of the meaning ascribed to those
words by the people who wrote and
ratified it.
Notwithstanding the caricatures in·
the press, the interpretivist model is
neither an invention of the Attorney
General's nor a plot to further the right
wing agenda. Interpretivism was the
dominant, the assumed, the unques­
tioned premise of judicial review for
the nation's first hundred years, and
much of its second. James Madison,
the principal framer of the Constitu­
tion, stated that "if the sense in which
the Constitution was accepted and rat­
ified by the nation is not the guide to
expounding it, there can be no security
for a faithful exercise of its powers."
ThomasJefferson wrote that" on every
question of construction, [we should]
carry ourselves back to the time, when
the constitution was adopted; recollect
the spirit manifested in the debates;
and instead of trying [to find] what
meaning may be squeezed out of the
text, or invented against it, conform to
the probable one, in which it was
passed.
"
Less than a generation ago, such
sentiments were uncontroversial. It
was common ground that the Consti­
tution, like statutes, contracts, and
other legal documents, must be read in
light of the intentions of those who
adopted it. Even Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., often cited as a critic
of the "Jurisprudence of Original
Intent," stated in the School Prayer Cases
(1963) that "the line we must draw
between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords
with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding of the Founding
Fathers." For some years, however,
judges and academics came to dis­
regard the original meaning of the
Constitution, in favor of their own pre­
ferred schools of political, economic,
and moral theory.
In 1971, Robert Bork, then a profes­
sor at the Yale Law School, fired the
opening salvo in the return campaign,
in an oft-cited article called "Neutral
Principles and Some First Amend­
ment Problems." In it, he reasoned
that interpretivist jurisprudence fol­
lows from "the resolution of the seem­
ing anomaly ofjudicial supremacy in a
democratic society." The courts are
authorized to invalidate decisions by
Restoring the proper
relation between unelected
courts and the elected
representatives of the people
is the foremost concern
of traditional legal
conservatives.
the elected representatives of the peo­
ple if and only if. the people have,
through the deliberate act of constitu­
tion making, placed certain matters
beyond the cognizance of their repre­
sentatives. The Court's power is there-
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fore legitimate, Bork wrote, "only if it
has, and can demonstrate that it has, a
valid theory derived from the Consti­
tution." If it "merely imposes its own
value choices," it violates the demo­
cratic postulates of the Constitution. If
ajudge cannot conclude, in good faith,
that the people have made a prior con­
stitutional judgment against a given
act of the legislature, there is only one
alternative: the judge must defer to
the legislature and enforce the law. It
cannot matter that the judge believes
the law to be unwise, unfair, or oppres­
sive. His job is not to make moral
judgments, but to enforce constitu­
tional principles that have been chosen
by others.
Perhaps the most important sphere
in which the original understanding of
the Constitution has been invoked by
the Supreme Court over the past ten
years to reverse its prior course has
been the area of separation of powers
-the way in which the Constitution
maintains the mutual independence of
the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government. From the
1930s until recently, the Court had
largely disregarded these features of
the Constitution, despite the fact that
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the framers of the Constitution
believed that the separation of powers
was the most important element of the
constitutional design.
[TheJudge's]Job is not to
make moralJudgments, but
to enforce constitutional
principles that have been
chosen by others.
Thus, the Court had approved such
constitutional aberrations as so-called
"independent" regulatory agencies,
had gutted the President's ability to
obtain confidential advice from even
his closest aides, and had watered
down the Constitution's express limita­
tions on judicial power, extending
court jurisdiction beyond actual "cases
and controversies" (cases involving the
concrete rights of individuals) to
include generalized grievances of a
political nature. (In the most flagrant
case, a group oflaw students was given
standing to challenge railroad rates for
recyclable materials on the ground that
the amount of recycling that takes
place would indirectly affect their use
and enjoyment of the national parks.)
Over the past decade, the Supreme
Court has revived the doctrine of sepa­
ration of powers in a series of impor­
tant cases, often quoting at length from
The Federalist Papers and other writings �
that demonstrate the original purpose
and meaning of the constitutional pro­
visions at issue. Among the most
important were Immigration and Natural-
.
ization Service v. Chadha (1983), which
invalidated the legislative veto, Buckley
v. Valeo (1976), which reaffirmed the
President's power to appoint subordi­
nate executive officers, Allen v. Wright
(1984), which limited the right of ideo­
logical plaintiffs to challenge executive
decisions that do not affect their legal
rights, and Bowsher o. Synar (1986),
which precluded Congress from
assuming the power to discharge offi­
cials who perform executive functions.
On the other hand, by a five to four
vote, the Court in Garcia u. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
overruled prior precedent that the
states retain certain constitutionally
protected spheres of sovereign author­
ity, which the federal government can­
not invade. This flies in the face of the
intention of those who drafted and rat­
ified the 1787 Constitution and Bill of
Rights. The Court explained that the
"principal and basic limit" on federal
power over the states will henceforward
be the self-restraint of Congress. Good
luck, states.
Liberal attacks on interpretivism
have caused some to assume, mista­
kenly, that a jurisprudence of original
intent would always produce substan­
tive results that accord with conserva­
tive politics. But most important
constitutional controversies have at
least two sides. Conservative advocates
may argue for the correctness of their
positions, but principled interpretivists
must be prepared to accept that in
some instances they may not prevail. A
line item veto is an example of an
excellent idea that is probably uncon­
stitutional (because it treats as a "Bill"
something that has not been approved
in that form by both the Senate and the
House in accordance with Article I,
Section 7), and affirmative racial pref­
erence by the federal government is an
example of something that ought to be
unconstitutional, but probably is not
(because Congress has express author­
ity to determine the best means of
enforcing equal protection, even
assuming, contrary to the text, that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to
Congress at all).
Nonetheless, given the nature of our
constitutional heritage, an inter­
pretivist jurisprudence will, more
often than not, be consistent with a
philosophy of decentralized govern­
ment, judicial restraint, racial equality,
and respect for life. It is no coincidence
that advocates of radical social change
have more to lose from a jurisprud­
ence of original meaning than those
who wish to conserve and affirm the
traditional values of the political
community.
Libertarianism
A second major strain in conservative
legal theory over the past ten years
is libertarianism. Libertarians under­
stand the Constitution principally as
an instrument of limited government,
and support an active judicial role in
preventing legislatures from overstep­
ping the bounds of their authority.
Libertarians therefore tend to be more
hospitable to challenges to governmen­
tal authority, less deferential to majori­
tarian institutions. If the animating
principle of interpretivism is demo­
cratic rule, that of libertarianism is
individual rights.
In theory there is no necessary con­
flict between libertarians and inter­
pretivists. If the libertarians are correct
-if it was the intention of the framers
and ratifiers of the Constitution to
limit dramatically the authority of gov­
ernment over the economic and other
decisions of individuals-then the two
approaches coincide. The main arena
of debate is the issue of economic liber­
ties: the right to hold and use property
and to make and enforce private agree­
ments, without government interfer­
ence, unless it is necessary to protect
the rights of nonconsenting· third
parties.
If the animating principle
of interpretivism is
democratic rule, that
of libertarianism is
individual rights.
Economic libertarians look to cer­
tain explicit provisions of the Constitu­
tion that protect. economic rights:
especially the contracts clause (no state
may "impair the obligation of con­
tracts"), the takings clause ("nor shall
private property be taken for a public
use without just compensation"), and
the due process clauses (neither the
states nor the federal government may
deprive any person of "property"
without "due process of law"). They
buttress the plain language of these
provisions with analysis of the philo­
sophical sources of these principles:
mainly John Locke; William Black­
stone, and, more distantly, Thomas
Hobbes. Their conclusion is that the
Constitution was intended to preclude
many forms of modern economic reg­
ulation that interfere with the liberties
of property and contract.
University of Chicago law professor
Richard Epstein has offered the most
comprehensive account of this posi­
tion. In his 1985 book, Takings: Private
Property and the Power ofEminent Domain,
Epstein argues that the words of the
takings clause have one simple,
unavoidable core meaning, derived
from the Lockean philosophy of the
Framers: that the property of one
person may not be taken from him
for the benefit of another. If allowed
its full intended sweep, the takings
clause would prohibit progressive
taxation, unemployment compensa­
tion schemes, requirements of unisex
annuity tables, welfare transfer pay­
ments, zoning laws, and much, much
more. One need not go as far as
Epstein has to recognize that the prop­
erty and contracts clauses of the Con­
stitution are part of the document, that
they were intended, like the others, to
have force and effect, and that the
modern Court's usual refusal to
enforce them is unprincipled.
Professor Bernard Siegan, of the
University of San Diego Law School
(whose nomination to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit faces serious opposition in the
Senate Judiciary Committee) reaches
many of the same conclusions, but on
the basis of very different jurispruden­
tial assumptions. Despite the radical­
ism of his conclusions, Epstein places
himself squarely in the interpretivist
camp. "Judges," he says, "must be
able to provide authoritative interpre­
tations of the constitutional text that
are not simply manifestations of their
own private beliefs about what legisla­
tion should accomplish."
Siegan advocates a far more discre­
tionary version of judicial review. In
his book Economic Liberties and the Con­
stitution, Siegan places principal reli­
ance on "substantive due process,"
ironically the same constitutional doc­
trine used in Roe v. Wade (1973), the
abortion decision. The due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the government
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from depriving any person of "life, lib­
erty, or property without due process
of law." Under the theory of substan­
tive due process, some (though of
course not all) species of liberty and
property are protected against legisla­
tive action, whether there has been
"due process" or not. Traditional
jurisprudential conservatives are skep­
tical of substantive due process, both
because of its inconsistency with the
text and purposes of the due process
clauses and because it invests judges
with unconstrained power to decide
which "liberties" will receive judicial
protection. Siegan, however, does not
hesitate to invoke the modern Court's
activist decisions, like Roe, to support
his argument that there is nothing
"unique" or "extraordinary" about
the notion that substantive due process
protects rights not mentioned in the
constitutional text or explicitly in­
tended by the framers.
Both Epstein and Siegan have
clashed with the interpretivist advo­
cates of judicial restraint. In 1984,
then-Judge Scalia warned in a widely
noted debate with Epstein, a former
colleague at Chicago, that a judiciary
powerful enough to enforce Epstein's
libertarian vision of government would
also be powerful enough to impose
"judicially prescribed economic liber­
ties that are worse than the pre-existing
economic bondage." "What would
you think," he asked, of a "constitu­
tionally guaranteed, economic right of
every worker to 'just and favorable
remuneration ensuring for himself and
his family an existence worthy of
human dignity?'"
Siegan's style of libertarianism
comes into still deeper conflict with
interpretivism. Robert Bork, for
example, has agreed that the intention
of the contracts and takings clauses
"has been a matter of dispute and per­
haps they have not been given their
proper force." But he claims that to
return to substantive due process
would work"a massive shift away from
democracy and toward judicial rule."
"This version of judicial review," Bork
argues, "would make judges platonic
guardians subject to nothing that can
properly be called law.
"
Especially among younger conser­
vatives, economic libertarianism is
often combined with broader social
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libertarianism. The commitment to
limited government leads many schol­
ars of the right to an expansive under­
standing of noneconomic individual
liberties. Liberals are frequently sur­
prised by the depth of support for sup­
posedly "liberal" positions on basic
civil liberties, such as freedom of
speech, association, and religion. In
fact, libertarians often make their lib­
eral counterparts look timid and
inconsistent by comparison. They
oppose restrictions on speech that lib­
erals often tend to support: campaign
finance limitations, regulation of com­
mercial speech" prohibitions on
employer speech in the course of a
labor organizing campaign, regulation
of the political balance of broadcasting
and cablecasting, restrictions on reli­
gious speech on public property, legal
harassment of peaceful protestors
against abortion clinics, and the like.
Libertarians also tend to oppose
government restrictions on pornogra­
phy and homosexual conduct, which
are generally supported by social as
well as many traditionalist conserva­
tives. Many also support legalized
abortion-though there is a significant
libertarian minority that recognizes
the right of the unborn to protection
against physical assaults from others.
Some libertarians believe in promot­
ing these objectives through constitu­
tionallitigation. Others, who combine
libertarian political principles with a
more traditional conservative jurispru­
dence, believe that they can legiti­
mately be attained only through the
democratic process.
Much of the drama and excitement
in the conservative legal community is
generated by the tension between the
libertarians and the "traditionalists."
The Cato Institute, for example, has
hosted fascinating exchanges between
the camps: the Epstein-Scalia debate
already mentioned, or a more recent
confrontation between traditionalist
Gary McDowell and Stephen Macedo,
libertarian author of a book entitled
The New Right versus the Constitution.
The libertarians and traditionalists are
carrying on a debate that has been
with us from the very beginning-the
never-resolved tension between indi­
vidual rights and democratic rule.
Law and Economics
Few developments in legal analysis-are
broad enough or important enough to
change the face of legal education. But
the law and economics movement,
born some twenty-five years ago and
brought to prominence in the past ten
years by such scholars as Richard
Posner (now judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sev­
enth Circuit), Ronald Coase, Aaron
Director, Guido Calabresi, and Gary
Becker, has profoundly affected the
way we think and talk about law. Not
just constitutional law, and not just law
pertaining to economic transactions,
but the entire corpus oflaw, from anti­
trust to family law to torts to criminal
law, has been touched or even trans­
formed by the law and economics
movement.
The persuasive strength of law and
economics comes from the analytical
power of the economic model. Eco­
nomics is now the preeminent social
science. It generates verifiable answers
to questions (not all questions, to be
sure, but many) and thereby provides
an objective basis for decisionmaking.
Law and economics is an attractive
legal movement because it provides a
basis for legal decisionmaking that is
not dependent on the subjective will of
the judge. It thus conforms to the fun­
damental principle of the rule of law.
Particularly for those who despair of
reaching conclusive answers to consti­
tutional questions from the historical
record, law and economics can serve
as an alternative way to preserve judi­
cial review without inviting judicial
tyranny.
It may be a mistake to label law and
economics part of the conservative
movement, for it has no overt ideologi­
cal element. However, it is usually
associated with the right because of a
shared belief in the efficiency and jus­
tice of a market based on consensual
transactions rather than government
fiat. Law and economics has assumed
a twofold task: to explain, and thus
bring intellectual coherence to, the
body of common law that lies at the
heart of our system of private rights;
and to provide an objective basis for
critique of legal arrangements that fail
the test of economic efficiency.
The most obvious successes of the
law and economics movement have,
not surprisingly, been in the fields of
business law such as antitrust and
securities. The impact can scarcely be
overstated. Fifteen years ago, the main
effect of the antitrust laws seemed to be
to protect businesses from the threat of
hard competition. Small businesses
were protected against large; distribu­
tors were protected against suppliers;
competitive price cutting was treated
with suspicion. Bork's The Antitrust Par­
adox and Posner's Antitrust Law: An Eco­
nomic Perspective changed all that.
Antitrust was reoriented toward pro­
tection of the consumer from agree­
ments among competitors to cut
production and raise prices.
Similarly, our understanding of cap­
ital markets and the role of securities
regulation has been greatly enhanced
by the work of law and economics
scholars such as Daniel Fischel and
Frank Easterbrook (now a judge on
the United States Court ofAppeals for
the Seventh Circuit). Takeovers, for
example, are now understood to be
powerful �arket forces in favor of
managerial efficiency-not, as a pre­
vious generation thought, as unpro­
ductive shuffling of assets.
In a broader sense, the law and eco­
nomics movement has influenced judi­
cial thought by emphasizing the fact
that legal rules influence future con­
duct. A judge cannot simply apportion
the gains and losses from past' events,
adopting a retrospective theory of jus­
tice. He must consider how future
actors will respond to the decision.
Comparing the Supreme Court's deci­
sions in the 1983 term to those in the
1973, 1963, and 1953 terms, then­
Professor Easterbrook concluded that
"[t]heJustices today are more sophisti­
cated in economic reasoning, and they
apply it in a more thoroughgoing way,
than at any other time in our history.
"
To the law and economics movement
belongs the credit.
The law and economics
movement has influenced
judicial thought fry
emphasizing thefact that
legal rules influence
future conduct.
The most radical subgroup within
law and economics is the "Public
Choice" school. Recently brought to
public notice by Nobel Prize winner
James Buchanan, public choice theory
subjects government to the same skep­
tical private interest analysis long
accorded to economic markets. The
theory demonstrates that government
power can and will be used to enrich
powerful private interests at the
expense of the public. Regulation,
which masquerades as protection of
the public interest, more frequently
serves special interests. Public choice
theorists have sparked a renewed inter­
est in legal and constitutional mecha­
nisms for cabining the power of
majoritarian institutions. The analyti­
cal justifications for the proposed
Balanced Budget Amendment, for
example, are an outgrowth of public
choice theory.
Both traditionalist and libertarian
conservatives look upon the law and
economics movement with a degree of
suspicion, because its philosophical
premises are frankly utilitarian (the
greatest good for the greatest number).
This creates a tension with traditional
conservative scholarship, which pre­
sumes that the Constitution embodies
certain fundamental political princi­
ples, which mayor may not be "effi­
cient," and leaves most other decisions
to the majoritarian process, which like­
wise is no guarantee of "efficiency."
Law and economics adherents are also
in tension with the libertarians, many
of whom uphold a vision of individual
rights that are entitled to prevail, even
when in conflict with the greatest good
for the greatest number.
The conflicts, however, are not
insurmountable. Because of its affir­
mation of the core of common law
principles, which also form the histori­
cal backdrop for understanding indi­
vidual rights under the Constitution,
law and economics scholars and more
traditional interpretivists will often
find themselves in agreement. And
because of the efficiency of markets
and systems of private ordering, law
and economics scholars will-with
only rare exceptions-take positions
compatible with libertarian conserva­
tives. Indeed, some libertarians justify
their position on a utilitarian basis not
unlike that underlying the law and
economics movement.
Social Conservatism
Another strain in American constitu­
tionalism seeks to preserve the inde­
pendence of so-called "mediating"
institutions, such as families, churches
and synagogues, communities, private
colleges and universities, and volun­
tary associations, from the homogen­
izing influences of national life. Com­
munitarian, or "social," conservatives
tend to prefer local" decentralized deci­
sionmaking over national, substantial
autonomy for private associations, lati­
tude for community standards of jus­
tice and morality, and-perhaps most
of all-enhanced protection for the
free exercise of religion.
While interpretivists focus on
democracy, libertarians on individual
liberty, and the law and economics
movement on efficiency, social conser­
vatives see community as the heart of
the American constitutional order. It is
vital, they believe, for groups of people
(whether defined by belief, member­
ship, or geography) to be able to estab­
lish mutually binding rules for
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themselves-even if those rules conflict
with the views of a wider national
majority or the interests of some indi­
viduals within the groups. Dissenting
individuals, after all, can choose some
other community, some other faith,
some other organization.
Enforcement of community stand­
ards for pornography is illustrative.
To the social conservative, anti­
pornography laws are legitimate and
important, because to allow each indi­
vidual to choose for himself whether to
purvey pornography denies every per­
son the right to live in an environment
free from pornography; and to set the
standard nationally (for example, by a
constitutional rule) would eliminate
diversity and the possiblity of choice
from the American scene. Community
control offers the only genuinely plu­
ralistic alternative. Neither Manhattan
nor Des Moines should be forced to
conform to the other's mores.
Social conservative theorists, fre­
quently of a religious bent, have
focused their energies on rolling back
constitutional theories of interpreta­
tion that squeeze the autonomy of
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communities between the twin pres­
sures of individualism and statism.
Social conservatives are virtually
unrepresented in elite academia, but
they have scored major victories in
court, such as the constitutional right
of ministers to counsel their flock with­
out fear of suit for "clergy malprac­
tice," the legitimacy of tax deductions
for private schools, the right of reli­
gious organizations to control their
own internal governance, the right of
communities to outlaw child pornog­
raphy, and the right of states to refuse
to fund abortions.
The most obvious contribution of
social conservatives to legal thought
over the past ten years has been in the
field of church and state. On this sub­
ject, the Supreme Court has heaped
confusion upon confusion. It has
drawn lines where no coherent line can
be drawn (for example, states can pro­
vide textbooks but not maps to paro­
chial schools). It has treated the
Social conservatives see
community as the heart
of the American
constitutional order.
establishment clause as if it were
directly contrary to the free exercise
clause. Perhaps most important, it has
elevated the notion of "a wall of sepa­
ration between church and state" to
the point where it eclipses the more
central value of religious liberty. Social
conservatives have played a major part
in bringing about a reexamination of
these issues. Their central theme is
that religion has a legitimate place in
American public life-that the Consti­
tution does not embody what Justice
Arthur Goldberg once described as "a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious."
Social conservatives share much
common ground with interpretivists,
since the principal barrier to commu­
nity self-determination is noninter­
pretivist constructions of the Constitu­
tion. The abortion decision, Roe v.
Wade (1973), for example, is both the
galvanizing issue for social conserva­
tives and the exemplar of judicial over­
reaching for interpretivists. And the
separationist decisions under the Reli­
gion Clauses are a prime example of
departure from the original meaning.
The relation of social conservatives
to libertarians is more complicated.
Their substantive preferences about
social policy frequently differ, and lib­
ertarians are often opposed to social
regulation even at the local community
level. Nonetheless, the two groups have
a common hostility to the dominant
feature of modern law-increasing
national homogeneity-and also share
significant common principles, such as
vigorous protection of the free exercise
of religion.
Conservative legal thought gained
ground during the past ten years
mostly in opposition to increasing
assertions of power by the federal judi­
ciary. As conservative thinkers become
conservative judges, and as the move­
ment changes from critic to actor, it
will face a different set of problems. It
must resolve or accommodate the ten­
sions within its ranks. It must come to
terms with over twenty-five years of
precedents, many of which, rightly or
wrongly decided, have become part of
our governmental framework. The
conservative commitment to stability
and institutional integrity makes them
less free than their liberal counterparts
to depart dramatically from past deci­
sions with which they disagree. Most
of all, the conservative movement must
be prepared to overcome the tempta­
tion of political expediency that comes
with judicial power. Conservatives
must not forget that judicial power
must be guided by an external prin­
ciple of law, precisely because it is
not accountable to the people many
other way. •
On a Clear Day What Can Be
Seen Ahead for the Federal
Income Tax?
In
general terms, the question I am
to address is whether the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 signals the
direction that major tax changes dur­
ing the next half dozen years can be
expected to take. More specifically, the
question is whether the 1986 trade-off
of broadening the individual income
tax base in exchange for reducing the
marginal rates of that tax will be a
major feature in at least one more sig­
nificant round of tax overhaul. My
answers, I believe, are in harmony
with the spirit of the challenge.
A short answer is perhaps the best
even though it probably seems too pat.
There are so many factors at work in
the political and legislative process of
taxation that prediction of things to
come in six years is treacherous. I
have, to be sure, long felt safe in pro­
gnosticating that the income tax provi­
sions of the Internal Revenu� Code
would grow by at least five percent a
year, the quantity of regulatory lan­
guage would increase at a faster rate,
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tax practitioners would somehow
spring up to keep pace with the rising
word count and the income tax law
would achieve new heights in complex­
ity. These successful peeks into the
crystal ball were essentially only cheap
shots. I surely did not foresee the 1986
Reform Act; and my earlier serious
projections scored best when dealing
with proposals that would not be
enacted rather than with those that'
would become law.
Conditional predictions about
major tax changes are of a different
order. It is a good bet that if we were to
become involved in a large scale war,
income tax: rates would rise and be
more highly graduated. If a wave of
populism were to dominate voter pref­
erences, the income tax would be more
redistributive, and so on. Foretelling
the start of a war or a new surge of
populism, however, is no easier a task
than foreseeing major shifts in the
income tax viewed apart from such
developments.
A somewhat longer answer to the
question at hand is that the 1986 Act
was an event that grew out of extraor­
dinary circumstances. To reach agree­
ment on a trade-off of base broadening
against reduction of marginal rates, an
unusual coalition of unlikely partners
was brought together. There were
those who favored base broadening
because it improved horizonal equity
among taxpayers-meaning that per­
sons with roughly equal amounts of
economic income would be called
upon to pay more nearly equal dollars
of tax. There were those who approved
of base broadening because a more
comprehensive tax base eventually
could be used to support a greater
degree of income redistribution from
the more to the less affluent members
of society. There were those who advo­
cated base broadening in order to
make the tax more neutral with respect
to alternative investment opportuni­
ties. There were' those who cham­
pioned reduced marginal rates because
they thought lower marginal rates
would encourage greater private sav­
ings, investment, and work effort. And
there were those who insisted that a
broader base and lower marginal rates
would result in a simpler income tax­
whatever that might mean.
This coalition might never have
formed in the absence of an over­
arching rule imposed on the process by
the political leaders: Unlike the ground
rules for past major tax legislation, the
whole package was to be revenue neu­
tral for a period of five years. By
accepting some black box magic in
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coming up with the projected revenue
figures, a somewhat curious presenta­
tion of revenue estimates over the years
ahead, and some heroic assumptions,
it could be said with a straight face that
the overall deal would neither increase
nor reduce income tax revenues.
The coalition required yet another
glue. Estimated revenues lost by reduc­
ing individual marginal rates would be
greater than those gained by broaden­
ing the base. To stay within the self­
imposed revenue neutrality constraint
the opposite prescription was invoked
for corporate tax. Estimated revenues
gained from base broadening would
exceed those lost by rate reduction. In
effect, corporate tax dollars were to be
substituted for individual tax dollars.
Such a rare environment seems hard
to recreate.
The fullest answer to the question
whether we should anticipate one
more swap of base broadening for
lower marginal rates may be the least
persuasive but easily the most thought
provoking. It focuses on the interac­
tion of the possible sources of addi­
tional base broadening and the
likelihood of a revenue-neutral con­
straint in designing the legislation.
Not much searching is needed to
uncover the main areas that could
produce potentially large addition3.I
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revenues through base expansion.
These are the main candidates: (1)
Repeal the deduction for state and
local property taxes not connected with
a trade or business. (2) Repeal or
dramatically cut back the deduction
for charitable contributions. (3)
Strengthen the minimum tax applica­
ble to individuals by raising the rate
and/or toughening the definition of
taxable income for purposes of the
Unlike the ground rulesfor
past major tax legislation,
the whole package was to
be revenue neutralfor a
period offiveyears.
minimum tax. (4) Eliminate or signifi­
cantly cut back the deduction for inter­
est payable on home mortgages. (5)
Greatly reduce the fringe benefits that
are now excluded from the tax base of
employees (and are deducted in com­
puting the tax base of employers). (6)
Reduce substantially the amount of
earned income that can be set aside
through qualified retirement plans on
a pre-tax or tax deductible basis. (7)
Treat transfer of assets at death as sales
at fair market value, thus taking a
decedent's gain or loss on the assets
into account. (8) End the exemption
for interest on new state and munici­
pal bonds.
Most striking about this list is the
degree of opposition that each of the
indicated moves would undoubtedly
engender. Eliminating the deduction
for non-business property taxes would
sharply depress the value of homes
because the tax deduction to an extent
is already impounded in the market
prices. Cutting back the deduction for
interest on home loans would reduce
the ability of homeowners to carry
their existing mortgages and of poten­
tial purchasers to finance acquisitions,
again putting a downward pressure on
home values. Narrowing the categories
of excludable fringe benefits would sig­
nificantly reduce the after-tax income
of workers-and have an adverse effect
on the utilization of health and life
insurance-especially in heavily
unionized sectors of employment. Put­
ting substantially lower ceilings on pre­
tax retirement accumulations would
run up against the popular notion that
the government should encourage pri­
vate retirement arrangements to take
pressure off the social security system
and to encourage more private sav­
ings. Taxing gains at death (particu-
1arly now that capital gains are to be
taxed at ordinary income rates) would
rally those who have invested in real
assets and equities, and in the process
would be likely to reopen the status of
the time honored realization doctrine
in our scheme of things. A racheting­
up of the minimum tax would arouse
those still in a position to benefit from
preferential provisions that are in the
law. Taxing interest on state and
municipal obligations would raise
howls from the issuing governments
and the bond industry. There is ample
cause to wonder about the appetite of
Congress to take on a combination of
some or all of this formidable array of
interests-bearing in mind that each is
well organized and articulate and that
most of these preferences are widely
enjoyed by the middle class and are
not generally regarded as abusive or
scandalous.
If there is a move to prune
further the preferential
treatment list, Ipredict
that the effort will be
associated with an increase
tn total revenues ...from the
income tax system.
On top of this practical concern is
the fact that most of these base broad­
ening possibilites have been on the leg­
islative table in the not-too-distant
past. After having traveled the long
road leading to the 1986 Reform Act
there will surely be considerable reluc­
tance to reexamine them again soon,
particularly in the context of creating
offsets to another reduction in mar­
ginal rates.
Other considerations strongly rein­
force this view. Included among the
special ground rules for the 1986 enact-
ment was the political understanding
that, except for those at the lower end
of the taxable income scale who would
be dropped altogether as taxpayers,
the relative tax burdens of the various
income classes would by and large
remain about the same as before. The
reconstruction of the tax, in other
words, was to be distributionally neu­
tral. It is doubtful that one could
accomplish such a result in working
with the various base broadening mea­
sures that have a potential for raising
1arge revenues. Without distributional
neutrality as a goal, however, hammer­
ing out a swap of base broadening for
rate reduction might seem to many a
much less inviting project.
The foreseeable difficulties in reach­
ing agreement on so-called tax reform
while keeping within the revenue and
distributional neutrality constraints
suggest that political leaders will not be
eager to embrace these shackles again
soon. If there is a move to prune fur­
ther the preferential treatment list, I
predict that the effort will be associated
with an increase in total revenues to be
raised from the income tax system. We
might well see base broadening but not
as part of a package that calls for
another reduction in marginal rates.
The case for cutting back on preferen­
tial provisions in order to raise greater
revenues might turn out to be more
appealing than doing so in order to
reduce marginal rates further.
What reason is there to think the tax
base might be significantly broad­
ened? After all, during the sixties and
seventies and early eighties the move­
ment was decidedly in the other direc­
tion. The favorite route of Congress to
reduce overall income tax revenues
was not to cut marginal tax rates but to
narrow the tax base. Various observers
forcefully assert that legislators have
more to gain in terms of funds or status
by doing something for certain of their
constituents rather than for their con­
stituency in general. A seat on a tax
writing committee can be a valuable
asset. Is there any good reason to
expect that congressmen will be guided
by a different calculus in the future?
My response is a tentative maybe.
At the moment I detect a broad feeling
(even in Washington) that prior to the
1986 Reform Act the base shrinking
game had simply gotten out of hand;
to such an extent that more and more
taxpayers perceived the system to be
unfair, perhaps leading to a growing
reluctance to comply with the law.
This assessment of the situation, if cor­
rect, may well dampen enthusiasm for
another burst of preferential provi­
sions (call them tax expenditures) for
some time to come.
On the other hand many of the play­
ers in the tax field have strong beliefs
that the government should do more to
guide or influence parts of our econ­
omy in what they regard as the right
directions. Numerous lawmakers
share this attitude. One inviting way of
encouraging or discouraging particu-
1ar economic activity is to provide
incentives or disincentives through
adjusting the income tax base, which
helps explain why legislators often find
that these adjustments are advanta­
geous from their point of view. The
attraction of managing the economy
could quickly cause the immediate
past history of the income tax to be
forgotten.
Not to be ignored is another force
that is apt to keep base-broadening on
the front burner. Staff advisers and
legislative assistants and their associ­
ates play an increasingly important
role in the tax law-making process.
This is not to suggest that they cast
votes or work out deals among con­
gressmen. They do, however, have a
high degree of familiarity with the law
and are frequently called on to formu­
late ideas for "improving" the income
tax or accomplishing some objective
on the agenda of a legislator. It is not
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surpnsmg to me that these analysts
often lean toward broadening the base
if circumstances permit.
Two pulls seem to be notably active.
One is the understandable feeling that
if you are working for the government
you should not give anything away to
taxpayers; you should, indeed, favor
putting an end to earlier giveaways.
This feeling is undoubtedly reinforced
by the omnipresence of the tax expen­
diture list-which can be thought of as
an official annual catalog of preferen­
tial provisions or subsidies to particu­
lar groups of taxpayers by way of tax
reductions. The list is sometimes pri­
vately labeled the giveaway docket. I
would expect that virtually every item
on the list is represented by one or
more proposals, already embedded in
some congressional computer, for end­
ing or curtailing the scope of that tax
expenditure.
The other pull stems from the pre­
dominant tone of publications by
economists dealing with government
finance. Henry Simons, my teacher,
still is a leader when this group of ana­
lysts turns to the personal income tax.
Simons contended that equity and eco­
nomic efficiency will be improved if
the base of the tax is defined, to the
extent practical, as income in the eco­
nomic sense, by which he meant con­
sumption plus net savings of each
taxpayer during the period when
income is being measured. It is not too
far off the mark to treat this conception
of taxable income as the foundation for
the tax expenditure list. Leaving out of
the tax base an element of economic
income that could feasibly be brought
into it is the core of a tax expenditure.
The government is seen in effect as
spending in the form of a tax subsidy
the dollars not collected as a result of
having preferential provisions in the
tax law.
To be sure, not all public finance
economists share the Simons approach
to income taxation. Those who favor
using the tax system to manage the
economy urge a wholly different pre­
scription. But their writings, as yet, do
not appear to have the same power to
persuade the generations now active
on the scene.
Law teachers also buttress the
notion of moving in a direction to
equate taxable income and economic
income. I know from personal experi­
ence that a good method of forcing stu­
dents to map the world of tax rules is to
use economic income as a touchstone.
This baseline constitutes a fine
jumping-off spot for analyzing a set of
rules realistically-for figuring out
who benefits or is burdened by the law
under inspection. Whether or not the
exercise works in class as intended, and
I think it does, it often also serves to
convince students that a Simons type
of approach is sound. Many of the
congressional legal advisers can very
likely trace their own predilections of
this kind to their classroom experience
in law school.
I should also mention a related
point, based mainly on hearsay. Some
law teachers do not seem very hesitant
to make known their strong attach­
ment to a more rather than a less pro­
gressive income tax. Such a viewpoint
perhaps also carries over from class-
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room to government service, although
the attractiveness of progression need
not originate in a law school course on
income taxation. My point is limited
to suggesting that many recent gradu­
ates in law might be counted on to
During the nearfuture tax
changes are unlikely to
extend the 1986 tax reform
theme cif broadening the
tax base in exchange
for reduction in
marginal rates.
push for a broader based tax but not
necessarily one that encompasses lower
marginal rates, feeling that top mar­
ginal rates are already too low and
cannot provide a sufficient degree of
progresslOn.
I have now come close to answering
the assigned question. My short,
longer, and fullest answers are that
during the near future tax changes are
unlikely to extend the 1986 tax reform
theme of broadening the tax base in
exchange for reduction in marginal
rates along the whole of the individual
income scale. But I must add a final
caveat. It is not inconceivable that
an altogether new combination of
changes, in part involving such a
trade-off, can be fashioned that will
draw together another successful coali­
tion. To illustrate: perhaps income tax
broadening and reductions in mar­
ginal rates might be joined with lifting
the ceiling on the social security tax
base and further increasing the corpo­
rate income tax rate. This, however, is
a matter more properly for the dream
world than for my scientifically based
prediction. •
Are Women at a Disadvantage?
In the Spring 1987 issue of The Law
School Record we published a letterJrom
Elizabeth Gorman Nehls )85 on the
position of women in law school. We
invitedyou to respond. Letters have been
edited solely because of space constraints.
To the Editor:
I am intrigued by Elizabeth Gor­
man Nehls's perceptions that women
students at the Law School, "as a
group, have not achieved the academic
and professional success that might be
expected, given their numbers," and
by her various explanations, including
that "women continue to experience
discrimination against them, only in
more subtle forms .... "
Initially, one might ask what mea­
sure of academic and professional suc­
cess might be expected of the Law
School's female students. Women at
the Law School have served on the
University of Chicago Law Review) been
moot court champions, graduated
cum laude, and been elected to the
Order of the Coif. Female graduates
have held judicial clerkships at all lev­
els, including the United States
Supreme Court; have been appointed
to powerful government positions,
such as federal prosecutor; and have
been elected to partnerships at some of
the nation's most powerful and presti­
gious law firms, to name but a few
accomplishments. This is an impres­
sive track record, indeed.
A second, more compelling question
is what numbers have to do with any of
this. I, for one, find nothing more sex­
ist or racist than the assumption that
all positions in society should be filled
in accordance with percentages deter­
mined by sex or race. This is not to
suggest that one should expect any
particular sex-based or race-based
makeup in society, but only that sex
and race should be immaterial. From
my perspective, we will be a less sexist,
less racist society when we stop per­
ceiving and categorizing people based
on sex and race ....
Ms. Nehls's sex-based introspection
on the reasons other than discrirnina­
tion (invidious, we presume, no matter
how subtle) that may account for per­
ceived disparities in the success rates of
male and female students seems only
to trade on outmoded stereotypes and
perpetuate unfortunate myths....
If, for example; women are "typi­
cally raised to accept an ethic of self­
lessness, of positive duties and
responsibilities to others, and of giving
first priority to the sustenance of inter­
personal relationships," as Ms. Nehls
claims, we might presume that men
are raised to accept the opposite. If
not, then Ms. Nehls's observation
about women is meaningless; but if so,
then men's ingrained "ethic of selfish­
ness" would seem to deprive them of
important personal resources: the
senses of duty and responsibility essen­
tial for assuming leadership roles in
society, and the interpersonal skills and
relationships necessary for successful
group interaction and for coping with
the anxieties of decision making....
Similarly, to the extent that a per­
ceived linkage between femininity and
passivity implies a linkage between
masculinity and aggression, that very
aggression could be a reason why men
should not succeed. Clients, cowor­
kers, supervisors, and constituents
frequently do not respond well to
aggressive, self-centered behavior....
Once again, the peculiarities of the
male makeup (if such exist) offer as
many reasons for failure as for success.
Finally, if Ms. Nehls's analysis
implies that men succeed in dispropor­
tionate numbers because they expect
to succeed, then it ignores a vast body
of empirical and anecdotal evidence.
The evidence is that many men do not
succeed in life, regardless of their
expectations. Ms. Nehls's analysis also
ignores the corresponding pressure
brought to bear, both by themselves
and by others, on those who are
expected to succeed. As standards
become set impossibly high, failure to
achieve them becomes inevitable....
The fear of possible failure and anxiety
caused by unrealistically high stand­
ards can in and of themselves deter
success.
In sum, Ms. Nehls's explanations
for a purported problem seem flawed
by very fundamental sexist notions
about both men and women. Such
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thinking is likely to perpetuate sexual
stereotypes, not reduce or eliminate
them. As for me, I simply don't per­
ceive the problem. I see nothing for
which women students or graduates of
the Law School have to apologize.
Women, like men, should simply
ask themselves if they are satisfied
with what they have accomplished as
individuals.
Very truly yours,
David L. Applegate '78
Karon Morrison & Savikas, Ltd.
Chicago
To the Editor:
Ms. Nehls implicitly offers a vision
of a brave new world, which I find
unsatisfactory-a world in which
women, in order to share in the boun­
ties that the men before them have
labeled success, have cast aside the
special qualities that they now (accord­
ing to Ms. Nehls) hold in such
abundance.
I refer in particular to the "ethic of
selflessness"-a quality lamented by
Ms. Nehls but in which I would find
cause for pride and joy. I must say, I
have my doubts that women in law
school are as selfless as Ms. Nehls sug­
gests. My experience was that one had
to look long and hard for a friend,
woman or man, who would make the
kinds of sacrifices that Ms. Nehls
describes as "self-defeating choices."
But if it is true that more women than
men possess this quality, then we
women must never be found wringing
our hands and looking to men to show
us a better way. We should proselytize
rather than apologize and strive to
ensure that men learn to sacrifice right
along with us. And we should do so not
only to lift some of the burdens now
placed on us-burdens that result
when only one group is expected to
make the kinds of personal sacrifices
Ms. Nehls describes-but also in order
to show that there is a better, a more
complete way to live a life....
[Ms. Nehls] offers a view of success
that I do not share. The choices that
she labels" self-defeating" are all deci­
sions in favor of personal relationships
and against conventional professional
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success, and she includes within the
category of women who have aban­
doned the struggle for success those
who choose to "'do good' through
charitable or political activities." If
success is measured only in terms of
one's CPA, fancy extracurriculars, and
financial net worth, then it will not
behoove ambitious women to make
sacrifices for the sake of others. But if
success is conceived more expansively,
then a failure to be unselfish might be
a failure to be successful. ...
It may not have crossed [Ms.
Nehls's] mind to ask the antecedent
question of what it is that we mean by
"success." In failing to ask this ques­
tion, however, one minimizes the con­
tribution that women can make to
society; one begins the debate by
assuming that the only progress to be
made is to place more women in cer­
tain positions. But if after all is said
and done ... we bring with us to the
courtrooms and the boardrooms and
the Oval Office only the bare fact of
our gender, then I will sadly conclude
that we have achieved little in compari-
son to what we might have done. Yet if
we bring with us not only our gender
but at least some of the qualities that
we have been taught to cherish and
maintain-a judicious selflessness and
measured self-sacrifice-then we will
have made an important change
indeed. Ms. Nehls describes a coup
d'etat; I envision a revolution....
I agree with Ms. Nehls that women
often react passively and often expect
to fail; and I think that these tenden­
cies may promote an excess of what
passes 'as generosity but is better
labeled insecurity. An insecure person
will make unnecessary and pointless
sacrifices; she will, perhaps, rush to the
aid of a friend who is really not in dis­
tress .... So I think that women must
be confident in order not to sacrifice
themselves into oblivion. A first step
toward gaining that confidence would
be to announce that our" special hand­
icaps not applicable to men" (as Ms.
Nehls describes them) are, in fact, no
such thing.
All of this is not to say that I am not
gleeful when I see a woman score a top
grade on an exam or land a particu-
larly (and conventionally) attractive
job; I am. The world I have sketched
should not be pictured as a place where
some people are thought successful
because they get good grades or write
persuasive briefs, and some because
they have good friends. On the con­
trary, it is a world in which such spe­
cialization has no place. Yet I do not
think that shouldering greater per­
sonal responsibility necessarily means
that everyone must endure a corres­
ponding decrease in professional
accomplishment. In fact, one of the
attitudes that women can help finally
to detonate is the tired notion that per­
sonal fulfillment and professional
achievement are mutually incompati­
ble. I sense that this notion is partly
responsible for Ms. Nehls's criticism of
the ethic of selflessness .... I am opti­
mistic enough to believe that happiness
promotes productivity, and I urge that
in trying to become good lawyers,
women not discard some of the quali­
ties that would make them good
people.
Sincerely,
Lisa Heinzerling '87
Chambers ofJudge Richard A. Posner
U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit
Chicago
To the Editor:
To Liz's generally cogent and
insightful analysis I would add that it
can be misleading to think of women
as a homogeneous group. Racial and
class differences remain important; the
expectations and experiences of white,
middle class women are not universal.
For example, to generalize, black
women lawyers seem to have fewer
issues of passivity and dependence and
guilt about working. Unlike their
white counterparts, black women of
course have always worked outside
their homes, as racism did not and
does not permit us the luxury of
dependence on our men. On the other
hand, expectations of failure by minor­
ity women themselves and their white
evaluators are greatly increased and
complicated by racism,
These differences must be taken into
account in designing any program to
meet the needs of all women students
and lawyers. Not only must the special
handicaps of traditional femininity be
recognized, but the greater burdens of
race and class must be addressed for
minority women.
Sincerely,
Colette Holt '85
Sidley & Austin
Chicago
To the Editor:
While I would agree with Liz that
women law students could benefit
from assertiveness training and career
counseling I was disturbed by her
ready acceptance of male values and
male conceptions of success as the
measuring stick by which to judge
women's achievements.
In her letter Liz identifies three
ideas or values which hold women
back and suggests they are handicaps
women should work to overcome. One
of the values which she identifies is the
Ethic of Selflessness, the concept of
helping others first and focusing on
oneself only after those obligations
have been fulfilled. . .. Liz blames this
ethic for pushing women toward chari­
table and political activities and thus
"opt[ing] for low career aspirations in
terms of what is generally conceived of
as success." But this statement reveals
the true problem. What is "generally
conceived of as success" is a male con­
ception of success. And if the standards
are based on male behavior, which is
then passed off a� human behavior,
women will naturally measure up
poorly....
It turns out that Lawrence
Kohlberg's well-known theory of
moral development with its hierarchy
of six stages was based on a study of
eighty-four boys. From this group of
boys he generalized to a universal the­
ory.... But since the model was based
on male development, it is no wonder
that women consistently rank low on
his scale. Likewise, if the legal profes­
sion persists in measuring success by
male standards, of course it will look
like women are failing. One could read
Liz's suggestion of special programs
and counseling for women students as
a scheme to mold women law students
into imitation male law students so
that they can better strive for male­
defined success. I think that is a mis­
take. . .. Rather than changing
women, a better solution would be for
the legal profession to recognize and
embrace women's values and thereby
redefine success.
Male law professors are in an ideal
position to encourage these changes in
the profession. They can start by rec­
ognizing that the profession, and the
law itself, has been a profession of men
-created by them and infused with
their values .... The lack of recognition
and support women law students
receive for their ideas in class goes a
long way toward explaining their hesit­
ance to speak up.
Increasing the number of women on
the faculty would be a very simple way
to broaden the range of ideas available
to faculty and students while giving
those ideas recognition. The school has
always said it would hire more women
.
if it could find some who met its high
standards. But this brings us back to
the definition of success. Women are
perceived as unqualified or unsuccess­
ful because they do not meet the male
standards. If the yardstick is based on
a male model of professorial qualifica­
tions, then of course women may not
measure up. Only by using standards
that recognize women's experiences,
ideas, and values can the measunng
stick be truly equitable.
Sincerely,
Eve Jacobs-Carnahan '86
Bingham Dana & Gould
Boston
To the Editor:
Although I attended the University
of Chicago Law School almost twenty
years before [Ms. Nehls] did and
although my life has been different
from that of most women graduates of
the law school, I found much in her
article that struck a responsive chord
In me.
I did not enjoy law school. Perhaps
that was due, as Ms. Nehls suggests it
might have been, to being one of
eleven women in a class of 148 when
we matriculated in 1965 and one of ten
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in a class of 125 when we graduated in
1968. Perhaps it was due to being in
school during the turbulent 1960's.
Perhaps it was due to being a Chica­
goan who had attended public schools
and a Midwestern college, both facts
that placed me outside the realm of the
Ivy League-Seven Sisters clique obvi­
ously prevalent at the Law School. ...
No woman chose to attend any law
school in the 1960s because her family
wanted her to or because she did not
know what to do with herself. We were
all conscious of being "different," of
being pioneers whether we wanted to
be or not. The U. of C. was, as far as
women per se were concerned, probably
the best place for a woman law student
in the 1960s. Congresswoman Pat Sch­
roeder says that when she sat down in
her assigned chair at Harvard Law
School in the early 60s, the men stu­
dents on either side got up, announced
they'd never attended school with a
woman before and never would, and
obtained new seats. That never hap­
pened at Chicago, I'm sure. The
faculty, without exception, exhibited
no bias I ever detected. The men
students, with one exception, rarely
exhibited animosity. The general
atmosphere, however, could often be as
cold as the Green Lounge on a Janu­
ary morning. Perhaps what women­
and others who find themselves in
ambiguous situations-needed and
still need is a supportive, friendly
atmosphere in which cooperation in
the group learning experience is more
important than competition within the
group. It will be a long time, however,
before one finds that in any American
law school.
Sincerely,
Ann Lousin '68
Professor of Law
John Marshall Law School
Chicago
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To the Editor:
Undoubtedly, some of what Ms.
Nehls says is true. On the whole, how­
ever, I think her letter misses the point.
In my experience at the Law School,
women students performed as capably,
if not more so, than their male col­
leagues. In my class (of 1978), for
example, women made up approxi­
mately 23 percent of the class but 36
percent of the members of the Law
Review and 37 percent of its editors.
Similar experiences have been noted
by my college classmates who attended
other well-known law schools; on the
whole, female law students perform as
well, if not better, than their male
counterparts.
There are real difficulties, however,
that. some women encounter in prac­
ticing law at large law firms. These are
not the result of an "ethic of selfless-
ness" or a "linkage of passivity"; on
the contrary, female lawyers I have
worked with in my law firm are every
bit as capable as their male counter­
parts. Rather, the difficulty is one that
has been encountered by women in
many fields today. It seems to me that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to com­
bine the practice of law in a large law
firm environment with motherhood
and the responsibilities of raising a
family. Men, too, often have family
responsibilities but inevitably in our
culture they do not seem to be as heavy
a burden and are not incompatible
with large law firm practice. It is in this
area that women face severe problems
that may, in many cases, handicap
their ability to obtain the highest pro­
fessional achievement and not in any
"expectation of failure" that they have.
Sincerely,
David W. Pollak '78
Morgan Lewis & Bockius
New York
Memoranda
APPOINTMENTS
Diane Wood
Faculty Tenure
On the recommendation of the Law
School faculty, Diane P. Wood was
granted tenure and promoted to Pro­
fessor of Law, effective July 1, 1988.
Ms. Wood received her undergraduate
and J.D. degrees from the University
of Texas at Austin. After completing
her formal education, Ms. Wood
clerked for Judge Irving L. Goldberg
of the Fifth Circuit and Justice Harry
A. Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme
Court. She then practiced in the fields
of commercial litigation and general
antitrust law at Covington and Burling
before joining the Law School faculty
in 1981. Ms. Wood's research interests
include federal civil procedure, inter­
national trade, and antitrust. In 1986
she served as special consultant to the
Antitrust Division of the U. S. Depart­
ment ofJustice, with the responsibility
of revising the Antitrust Guide for
International Operations.
Visiting Faculty
Dennis E. Curtis will serve as a Visit­
ing Professor at the Law School in the
Fall Quarter, 1988. He will teach the
legal profession course and a seminar.
After receiving his B. S. degree from
the U.S. Naval Academy in 1955, Mr.
Curtis was a line officer in the U. S.
Navy for eight years. He then went to
Yale Law School and received his
LL.B. degree in 1966. After a short
period in private practice, Mr. Curtis
joined the faculty of Yale Law School
in 1969 where he taught various
aspects of criminal law. He went to the
University of Southern California in
1981, where he teaches professional
responsibility, trial and appellate advo­
cacy, and post-conviction issues. Since
1969 his primary responsibility has
been the design, development, and
administration of clinical programs.
Martin D. GinsburgJ Professor of
Law at Georgetown University Law
Center, will visit the Law School in the
Fall Quarter and will teach a course
and seminar in taxation. Mr. Gins­
burg graduated magna cum laude
from Harvard Law School and entered
private practice in New York in 1958.
He gave up full-time practice when
appointed the Beekman Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School. He
moved to Georgetown University in
1980 when his wife, Ruth Bader Gins­
burg, became a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Mr. Ginsburg served as
chair of taxation committees for the
Bar Associations of the city and state of
New York and the American Bar Asso­
ciation and has served on advisory
groups to the Commissioner of Inter­
nal Revenue and the Tax Division of
the Department ofJustice. Since 1974
Mr. Ginsburg has acted as consultant
to the American Law Institute's Fed­
eral Income Tax Project on the revi­
sion of the corporate and partnership
tax laws. He has taught at New York
University School of Law, Stanford
Law School, the University of Leyden
in the Netherlands, the Salzburg Semi­
nar in Austria, and Harvard Law
School. Mr. Ginsburg is a Fellow of the
American College of Tax Counsel and
a frequent speaker at tax seminars.
Judith Resnik, Professor of Law at
University of Southern California Law
Center, will visit the Law School in the
Judith Resnik
Fall Quarter, 1988. After graduating
cum laude from Bryn Mawr College in
1972, Ms. Resnik studied at New York
University School of Law, receiving
her J. D. degree, cum laude, in 1975.
She clerked for Judge Charles E. Ste­
wart, Jr. of the United States District
Court of the Southern District of New
York, then taught at New York Univer­
sity School of Law for one year and at
Yale Law School for three years. She
went to USC in 1980. Ms. Resnik has
written extensively in areas of civil
procedure and criminal justice. While
at Chicago, she will teach Civil Proce­
dure I and a seminar.
Robin West
Robin L. WestJ Assistant Professor
at the University of Maryland School
of Law, will spend the Winter and
Spring Quarters, 1989, at the Law
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School. Ms. West teaches contracts,
jurisprudence and law and literature.
She graduated in 1976, cum laude,
from the University of Maryland and
received her JD. degree from that
University's school oflaw in 1979. She
also holds a Master of Juridical Sci­
ence degree from Stanford Law
School. Ms. West has taught at
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
and at Stanford Law School. She has
written widely on feminist theory and
law and literature.
Lecturers in Law
Sheldon Banoff, Senior Tax Partner at
Katten Muchin Zavis Pearl Green­
berger & Galler in Chicago, will teach
a seminar in real estate transactions in
the Spring Quarter, 1989. Mr. Banoff
is a 1974 graduate of the Law School.
He was an associate editor of the Uni­
versity oj Chicago Law Review and
received the Jerome Frank prize for an
outstanding comment published in the
Law Review. Mr. Banoff has written
widely in the field of taxation and is a
member of several professional bodies
including the Executive Council of the
Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxa­
tion Committee and the University of
Chicago Law School's Tax Conference
Planning Committee.
Samuel Thompson
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., will
teach a business seminar at the Law
School in the Fall Quarter, 1988. Mr.
Thompson is the partner in charge of
the tax division at Schiff Hardin &
Waite in Chicago and director of the
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graduate tax program at lIT Chicago­
Kent College of Law. He graduated in
1965 from West Chester State College,
Pennsylvania and earned his M.A.
degree in business and applied eco­
nomics at the Wharton School, Uni­
versity of Pennsylvania. He received
his JD. from the University of Penn­
sylvania Law School in 1971, then
went on to the New York University
School of Law where he received an
LL.M. degree in taxation in 1973.
Throughout his career, Mr. Thomp­
son has alternated between university
teaching (at Northwestern University
School of Law and University of Vir­
ginia School of Law) and private prac­
tice. He has also been attorney-adviser
to the Tax Legislative Counsel and the
International Tax Counsel's offices in
the U. S. Treasury Department.
Mandel Legal Aid Clinic
Robert R. Cohen was appointed Staff
Attorney and Clinical Fellow in Sep­
tember, 1987. He graduated from the
University of Maryland in 1983, with a
B. S. 'degree in accounting and earned
his JD. degree from the University of
Chicago Law School in 1986. After law
school, Mr. Cohen joined the law firm
of Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago,
practicing securities, First Amend­
ment, insurance, labor, and contract
law. He is currently on leave of absence
from the firm. While at the Mandel
Clinic, he will work on the Employ­
ment Discrimination Project.
Sara L. Johnson joined the Mandel
Legal Aid Clinic as Staff Attorney and
Clinical Fellow on November 30, 1987.
She is currently responsible for the
Clinic's utility practice and plans to
initiate work in the health care area
later this spring. Ms. Johnson gradu­
ated from Washington University in
St. Louis in 1978 with a degree in his­
tory and economics. She received her
JD. degree from the University of
Chicago Law School in 1981. After
graduation from law school she spent
six years with the law firm of Schiff
Hardin & Waite in Chicago, specializ­
ing in civil litigation.
LAW SCHOOL NEWS
Visiting Committee
The annual meeting of the Visiting
Committee took place on November
10 and 11, 1987. After introductory
remarks from Dean Geoffrey Stone, the
members of the committee heard a
panel discussion on the Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic, with presentations by its
director, Professor Gary Palm (J D.
'67), Mark Heyrman (JD. '77), Lec­
turer in Law and currently visiting
Associate Professor at Northwestern
University Law School, and Randall
Schmidt (JD. '79), Clinical Fellow.
Visiting Committee members Morton
Zalutsky un. '60), King V. Cheek,
Jr. (f.D. '64), and Roberta Ramo
a.n. '67) get together before the first
panel discussion.
This was followed by a panel discus­
sion concerning the Clinic from the
student's perspective, in which current
clinic students participated. Students
joined the Committee for lunch. In the
afternoon, the Committee took part in
a discussion about the Trial Practice
and Major Civil Litigation courses at
the Law School, presented by the
teachers of those courses, Judge War­
ren Wolfson, Mr. Michael Howlett,
andJudgeJames Holderman. The dis­
cussion was followed by a presentation
by five faculty members, Professors
Albert Alschuler, Mary Becker (JD.
'80), Walter Blum (JD. '41) James
Holzhauer, and Geoffrey Miller, about
clinical legal education at the Law
School.
Professor Richard Helmholz, Ruth
Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law and
Director of the Legal History Pro-
gram, delivered the annual Wilber
G. Katz Lecture in the Weymouth
Kirkland Courtroom. The title of his
talk was "The Formation of the West­
ern Legal Tradition Unformulated."
Mr. Helmholz first looked at the publi­
cation of a successful but controversial
book by Harold Berman of Harvard
Law School, entitled Law and Revolu­
tion: The Formation of the ffistern Legal
Tradition. Describing the work as an
R. H. Helmholz
"event oflegal significance", he never­
theless argued that it relied too heavily
on a single formula. He "unformula­
ted" Berman's account in the rest of
his talk, taking three themes from the
book: the useful concept of a Western
legal tradition, the influence of canon
law on this tradition, and the idea that
an appreciation of Western legal tradi­
tion will help us overcome the current
age of legal crisis. He illustrated these
with three examples from the history of
the common law: the adoption of
Magna Carta in 1215, the creation of
the English Poor Law in the sixteenth
century, and the development of the
privilege against self-incrimination in
the seventeenth.
The lecture was followed by a recep­
tion in the .foyer and dinner for the
Visiting Committee and other guests
in Lower Burton Lounge.
The following day, members of the
Committee learned about programs at
the Law School. Professor David
Strauss discussed the new Law and
Government Program; Professor
Stephen Schulhofer talked about the
Center for Studies in CriminalJustice;
ProfessorJohn Langbein talked about
Forty Years of Tax
Conferences
Last October marked the fortieth anni­
versary of the University of Chicago
Law School's Federal Tax Conference,
one of the nation's leading tax confer­
ences. The guiding light of the confer­
ence for thirty-nine of its forty years
has been Walter J. Blum (J.D.
'
41),
Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service
Professor at the Law School. Mr. Blum
looked back to the origins of the
conference.
"It was originally started by Robert
R. Jorgensen, the director of taxation
at Sears, Roebuck, who was also
closely affiliated with the University's
Business School and the Downtown
Center, the original sponsors of the
conference. I attended that initial con­
ference and then stole it for the Law
School. "
The Federal Tax Conference was
founded because the post-war years
saw a huge new interest in taxation, as
the tax laws became more pervasive
and broadly based. Taxes now affected
far more people than before World
War II. The conference served as a
forum for discussion for experts
involved with the problems of federal
taxation-lawyers, accountants, and
business executives-rather than as an
introduction to the field.
Initially, when there were few con­
tinuing professional educational pro­
grams and little up-to-date reporting
available to tax practitioners, the con­
ference papers tended to focus on the
technical details of the law. It was
widely thought that a good paper sum­
marized the laws and the directions in
which it was headed. Today the Plan­
ning Committee discourages this
approach. Emphasis is now placed on
analysis rather than on a statement of
the law. The conference is approved
for credit for continuing professional
education and the proceedings of each
conference are published in the
December issue of TAXES- The Tax
Magazine.
Other changes are due to the much
more rapid pace of tax legislation
today. During the first two decades of
the conference major tax legislation
was seldom enacted more frequently
than every four to six years. Now,
WalterJ. Blum
important legislation is passed almost
every year. Under these circum­
stances, the Planning Committee must
gamble, many months in advance, on
what items will be of interest at the
time of the conference. So far, its
guesses have beaten the odds, includ­
ing the fairly safe bet for the fortieth
conference last October that the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 would still be of
keen interest to tax experts in 1987.
Speakers at the last conference, enti­
tled "Tax Reform Act of 1986: Revolu­
tionary, Not Evolutionary" included
Howard Krane G.D. '57) of Kirkland
& Ellis and Paul Strasen G. D. '81) of
Bell Boyd & Lloyd in Chicago, as well
as Eric Zolt G.D. '78) from UCLA
School of Law and speakers from law
and accounting firms in Chicago,
Washington, D. c., Houston, Detroit
and Los Angeles.
The fifteen-member Planning
Committee, drawn primarily from law
and accounting firms in Chicago,
numbers several Law School alumni
among its members: Sheldon Banoff
G·D. '74), Stephen Bowen G.D. '72),
and Howard Krane, as well as the
chair for the past two years, Burton
Kanter G.D. '52). Howard Krane
noted that the future of the tax confer­
ence is clear.
"It will be business as usual, in the
sense that nothing remains the same.
Under Walter Blum's guidance, the
conference has always kept pace with
tax laws and has changed direction as
the laws have changed. It will continue
to do so, probably, for as long as the
Federal government continues to
impose taxes on its people."
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the Legal History Program; and Pro­
fessor Daniel Fischel (JD. '77) dis­
cussed the Law and Economics
Program. An executive session with
Dean Stone followed. The meeting
closed with lunch with the faculty. Tra­
ditionally, the youngest faculty mem­
ber speaks to the Visiting Committee
at the closing luncheon. Professor
Larry Kramer (JD. '84) spoke about
New Wave Scholarship.
A list of members of the Visiting
Committee can be found on page 52 of
this magazine.
Fulton Lecture
The inaugural Maurice and Muriel
Fulton Lecture in Legal History was
given on November 19 by Professor
Charles Donahue, Jr., of Harvard Law
School. His talk was entitled "The
Monastic Judge: Social Practice and
Formal Rule in Medieval Marriage."
He examined the strict rules of medie­
val marriage, under which all those
related within the fourth degree of con­
sanguinity (same great great grandfa­
ther) and affinity (relations contracted
by marriage) were forbidden to marry.
Tracing the career of Richard of Clyve,
a thirteenth-century Canterbury
monk who judged many marriage
cases, Mr. Donahue showed the evolu­
tion of one judge's views on how
strictly the law should be enforced.
The Fulton Lecture has been
endowed by Mr. and Mrs. Maurice
Fulton G.D. '42) to bring a distin­
guished speaker from outside the Law
School to deliver a public lecture. Pro­
fessor R. H. Helmholz, Ruth Wyatt
Rosenson Professor of Law and Direc­
tor of the Legal History Program, said
that the Fulton Lecture will help to fur­
ther the aim of the Program to bridge
gaps between different disciplines and
institutions. The Fulton Lecture
attracted an audience from the Uni­
versity's History Department and
from other law schools in the area.
Many of Mr. and Mrs. Fulton's
friends also attended.
A reception was held in the new part
of the Harold J Green Lounge after
the lecture, followed by dinner- for
invited guests in Lower Burton
Lounge.
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Legal Forum Symposium
The University of Chicago Legal
Forum held its third annual sympo­
sium at the Law School on December
5. The theme of the symposium was
"Testing in the Workplace." Leading
academics and practitioners from the
private sector and public interest
groups explored the uses and legality
of testing in the workplace, focusing on
the balance between individual rights
and employer interests in workplace
screening procedures. The symposium
was divided into three panels. The first
panel offered a general perspective on
legal issues including the right to
privacy, defamation through the dis­
semination of test results and the con­
stitutionality of testing under the
Fourth Amendment. Speakers were
Alan Westin, Professor of Public Law
and Government at Columbia Univer­
sity, Elaine Shoben, Professor of Law
at the University of Illinois Urbana­
Champaign, and Allan Adler, Legisla­
tive. counsel for the ACLU and the
Center for National Security Studies.
In the afternoon, the second panel
examined the roles and rights of par­
ties involved in workplace testing,
looking at employer interests, the fed­
eral government's role in testing pro­
grams and the responsibility of labor
unions for protecting workers. Speak­
ers were Peter Bensinger, President of
Bensinger, DuPont & Associates,
James Holzhauer, Assistant Professor
of Law at the University of Chicago,
and Paul Levy (JD '76), an attorney
with the Public Citizen Litigation
Group.
The final panel's speakers were
Lance Liebman, Professor of Law at
Harvard University, Mark Rothstein,
Professor of Law and Director, Health
Law Institute at the University of
Houston, and Richard Epstein, James
Parker Hall Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago. They looked at
the right to test for AIDS, the ethics of
medical screening for drugs and
AIDS, and the consequences of wide­
spread testing, which results in an
expanded knowledge ofworkers' medi­
cal profiles.
State Representative Carol Moseley Braun aD. '72) speaking at a panel
discussion entitled "Keeping the Dream Alive, JJ in memory of the late Harold
Washington, mayor of Chicago. Other speakers wereformerfifth ward Alderman
Leon Despres aD. '29), State Senator Richard Newhouse (f.D. '61), andfifth
ward Alderman Lawrence Bloom aD. '69). The discussion was sponsored by the
Progressive Law Students Association and was held onfanuary 18 in honor of the
birthday observance of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Reproduction Rights
Program
The Glen R. Lloyd auditorium was
packed to capacity on Friday, January
22, 1988, the fifteenth anniversary of
the historic U.S. Supreme Court deci­
sion in Roe v. JiVclde. The audience of
Law School students and members of
the University community had gath­
ered to listen to a panel of speakers dis­
cuss "The Struggle for Reproductive
suit disputing the constitutionality of
Texas criminal abortion laws and how
she eventually found herself as the
youngest woman lawyer (age 26) to
argue a landmark case before the U. S.
Supreme Court. Although Roe's baby
had been born before the case came up
(ironically, aborting the baby would
have aborted the case), it was impor­
tant to argue the principle to the end.
"Law is for justice, not just for com­
merce," said Ms. Weddington.
Sarah Weddington, Colleen Connell, Catharine MacKinnon, and Eleanor Smeal,
panelists in the discussion on reproduction rights.
Freedom: Roe v. Wade 1973-1988."
The seminar was sponsored by the
University of Chicago Law Women's
Caucus, the University of Chicago
Black Women's Political Caucus, and
the University of Chicago Women's
Union and received funding from the
Daniel and Susan Greenberg Fund at
the Law School as well as from the
University's Student Government
Association.
In his introductory remarks, Dean
Geoffrey Stone noted that the impend­
ing appointment of a newJustice to the
Supreme Court might result for the
first time in a majority of justices who
would be unsupportive of the Roe deci­
sion. Before the main speakers began,
Assistant Professor Diane Wood
sketched in the background to the case,
explaining that the Court's decision
was based on very broad constitutional
grounds that freed women from state
restrictions on their right to control
their own 'lives, but that allowed the
states to test the limits of the decision
by attempting to restrict abortions on
several grounds. So far, she said, the
Court has struck all these down except
the prohibition on public funding of
abortions.
Sarah Weddington, the attorney for
the plaintiff in Roe v. JiVclde} related how
she came to file the original Roe law-
Colleen Connell, staff attorney of
the ACLU Project for Reproductive
Rights, described what has happened
in legislation and litigation since Roe.
Unlike Professor Wood, she did not see
the many cases since Roe as "testing
the limits" of Roe} but rather as reflect­
ing a lack of concern for the health of
women and a hostility to fundamental
rights. She cited Illinois as a particu­
larly insensitive state.
Catharine MacKinnon, Visiting
Associate Professor of Law and the
author of Feminism Unmodified as well as
coauthor of the Indianapolis Anti­
Pornography Statute, equated the
right to abortion with sexual equality.
She listed other areas of the sexual
devaluation of women, such as por­
nography and prostitution and, look­
ing toward the future, predicted that
until women gain the rights to sex on
their own terms and to whole lives
while also having children, the abor­
tion right will remain crucial to every
other form of sex equality.
The last speaker, Eleanor Smeal,
past president of the National Organi­
zation of Women, bitterly recalled her
dealings with legislators who would
support women's issues only if they
could make political capital out of it.
The rights of women to be treated as
equal citizens are strongly supported
by public opinion, she said, but
women are losing in the legislatures.
"We are very tired of begging to pre­
dominantly all-male bodies for our
fundamental rights to medical care, to
decent pay, to all kinds of conditions."
The panel discussion was followed
by twenty minutes of questions from
the audience.
John S. Lord and Cushman
B. Bissell Scholarships
The Chicago-based law firm of Lord,
Bissell & Brook has added funds to a
scholarship first established in 1979 in
memory of John S. Lord. The addi­
tional funding, a total of$150,000, will
now also honor Cushman B. Bissell,
who died in April, 1987. The scholar­
ship supports first- and second-year
students who demonstrate academic
excellence, initiative, and leadership
qualities.
Thomas R. Mulroy
Gift to Moot Court
Incentives to enter the Moot Court
Competition have increased, thanks to
a $100,000 gift from Chicago attorney
Thomas R. Mulroy (JD. '28). Mr.
Mulroy, senior counsel at the Chicago
firm of Hopkins & Sutter, has
endowed prizes for the competition.
The first and second place winners of
the Hinton Moot Court Competition
will be awarded the Thomas R.
Mulroy Prize for Excellence in Appel­
late Advocacy in amounts of $1,000
and $500 respectively, and twelve
semifinalists will receive awards of
$200. Mr. Mulroy's gift doubles the
amounts previously awarded to first
and second place winners and estab­
lishes for the first time awards for
semifinalists.
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The judges of this year's final com­
petition on May 11 will be Robert Bork
(J.D. '53), formerly ajudge of the US.
Court of Appeals, District of Colum­
bia Circuit; ChiefJudge Patricia Wald
of the US. Court of Appeals, District
of Columbia Circuit; and Judge John
Minor Wisdom of the US. Court of
Appeals, 5th Circuit.
Hormel Loan Forgiveness
Program
The first year of the Hormel Loan For­
giveness Program has now been com­
pleted. Four graduates have benefited
from the Program, which was set up by
James Hormel (J.D.
'
58) to help grad-
uates who are working in public ser­
vice areas to repay their student loans.
The loan forgiveness program is part
of a wider public service program
being developed by Mr. Hormel and
the Law School to encourage gradu­
ates to take up careers in public ser­
vice. Joan Meier (J.D. '83), who
worked with the Public Citizen Litiga­
tion Group, Susan Donnelly (J.D.
'83), with the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board, Aaron Iverson
(J.D. '85), in the Cook County States
Attorney's Office, and Catharine For­
est (J.D. '87), also with the Cook
County States Attorney's Office, have
all received assistance during the past
year. Several other graduates have also
inquired about qualification. Any
graduate seeking information about
the program and an application form
should call or write to Assistant Dean
Richard Badger (J.D. '68), University
of Chicago Law School, 1111 E. 60th
Street, Chicago, IL 60637, telephone
(312) 702-9484.
Edith Kreeger Wolf
Edith Kreeger Wolf died on August 19
at the age of 83. In 1965 Mrs. Wolf
established the Julius Kreeger chair at
the Law School in honor of her first
husband, who was a Chicago attorney
and 1920 graduate of the Law School.
Mr. Kreeger died in 1961. The Julius
Kreeger Professorship in Law and
Criminology is held by Professor
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Norval Morris. Throughout her life,
Mrs. Wolf maintained a lively interest
in Mr. Morris's work and that of the
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice.
Young Presidents'
Organization
Seventy-five members of the Young
Presidents' Organization visited the
Law School on January 20 as part of
their Midwest Convention. The YPO
is an organization of successful busi­
ness leaders each of whom became the
chief executive of a firm before his or
Dean Geoffrey Stone speaks to the
Young Presidents) Organization at a
welcoming luncheon before their
seminar on the Law and Economics
Program.
her fortieth birthday. The organization
exists to educate and foster exchanges
of ideas among its members. The Law
School visit introduced YPO members
to the work of the Law and Economics
Program. After introductory remarks
from Judge Richard Posner, the visi­
tors heard brief talks on law and eco­
nomics in the business world from
Professors William Landes) Dennis
Carlton (from the Business School),
Daniel Fischel) and Judge Frank
Easterbrook (J.D. '73). Following a
break for coffee, the YPO visitors
looked at law and economics in a wider
perspective with Professors Richard
Epstein, A Ian Sykes, Douglas Baird,
and Geoffrey Miller. The visit closed
with a reception at the Oriental Insti­
tute and dinner in Hutchinson
Commons.
Class of 1990
This year's entering class has 176 stu­
dents, including nineteen minority
students, a record number. Forty-one
percent of the class are women, which
is also the highest percentage ever. The
students come from all over the United
States, with an emphasis on the Mid­
west and Eastern states. More than
half the students come to law school
after a break of a year or more since
obtaining their undergraduate degree.
Over 10 percent of the entering stu­
dents have graduate degrees. Many
had pursued other careers before
entering law school. This year's enter­
ing class includes a developmental
psychologist, a speech therapist,
two accountants, a Navy pilot, two
Marines, two newspaper reporters, an
IRS Revenue Officer and a hearing
officer in the Colorado Department of
Revenue. Several students have served
as researchers and analysts in the
worlds of business and finance and a
number have been paralegals in law
firms. There are also teachers, editors,
and technical and speech writers.
FACULTY NOTES
In July, Albert W. Alschuler, Professor
of Law, testified before the Criminal
Justice Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee. He urged Con­
gress not to allow the sentencing guide­
lines proposed by the United States
Sentencing Commission to take effect.
During the same month, Mr. Alschu­
ler spoke in London to a conference on
Reform of the Criminal Law; he com­
pared recent Australian, Canadian,
and American sentencing reform pro­
posals. In September, Mr. Alschuler
spoke to a national conference of state­
court judges in Phoenix on "Presiding
in Criminal Court." He also traveled
to Boston, where he debated Gerald
Frug of Harvard Law School on "Crit­
ical Legal Studies." In October, Mr.
Alschuler spoke to the Illinois Acad­
emy of Criminology on recent
Supreme Court decisions in criminal
procedure cases. In November, he
appeared before the local chapter of
the Federalist Society to debate the
merits of limiting the exclusionary rule
with Stephen Markman, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the
Office of Legal Policy of the Justice
Department. During the week that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines became
effective, Mr. Alschuler spoke to the
judges of the United States District
Court in Chicago on "Departures and
Plea Agreements under the Guide­
lines." He participated in an Ameri­
can Law Institute conference at the
Rutgers-Camden Law School mark­
ing the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Model Penal Code. Mr. Alschuler also
discussed the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines at a faculty "work in
progress" luncheon and debated the
merits of these guidelines on "CBS
Nightwatch" with Judge Stephen G.
Breyer.
Paul M. Bator, John P. Wilson Pro­
fessor of Law, participated in a sympo­
sium on the United States Supreme
Court at the Judicial Conference of the
Fourth Circuit, held in June in Hot
Springs, Virginia. In September, he
testified on behalf of Robert Bork's
(JD. '53) nomination to the Supreme
Court before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. In October, Mr. Bator
gave one of the bicentennial lectures,
on "The Future of the Constitution,"
at Brigham Young University Law
School, in Provo, Utah. At the end
of that month he gave a lecture on
Federal Preemption at a seminar in
Boston on Products Liability, orga­
nized by the Products Liability Advi­
sory Council. At the beginning of
November, he argued the case for the
appellees in Virginia v. American
Booksellers Association in the United
States Supreme Court. Later in the
month he participated in the Attorney
General's conference on Tort Reform
in Washington, D. c., where he gave a
talk on "Integrating Tort Law with
Health and Safety Regulation."
In August, Jonathan K. Baum
(JD. '82), Staff Attorney and Clinical
Fellow in the Mandel Legal Aid
Clinic, saw the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reverse sum­
mary judgment for the defendant in
Bennett v. Tucker, a case Mr. Baum had
argued for the plaintiffs [see last issue
of the Record for discussion of the case].
During the autumn quarter, Mr.
Baum launched a new welfare/
employment project for the Clinic.
The project combines law and social
work students in efforts to obtain for
clients on public assistance the
employment-enhancing services (day
care, training, transportation) to
which they are entitled under Illinois'
new welfare-to-work program, Project
Chance. The Clinic's project also aims
to prevent illegal termination of bene­
fits for "noncooperation" with state
work requirements when necessary
supportive services are not provided.
In November, Mr. Baum was the mod­
erator of a program on "State Consti­
tutions as Guarantors of Individual
Rights" at the joint meeting of the Illi­
nois State Bar Association and the Illi­
nois Judges' Association. The
program's keynote speaker was Cali­
fornia Supreme Court Justice Stanley
Mosk (J.D. '35).
Gerhard Casper, William B. Graham
Distinguished Service Professor of
Law, spent the months of November
and December at the University of
Munster, Federal Republic of Ger­
many, as a Visiting Fellow. His visit
was made possible by a research prize
awarded by the Alexander von Hum­
boldt Foundation. On November 16,
he delivered a paper on federalism at a
symposium organized by the Law
Faculty of the University of Vienna to
celebrate the Bicentennial of the U. S.
Constitution. Mr. Casper will be a Vis­
iting Professor of Law at the University
of Munich from May 1 to July 31.
Ronald H. Coase, Clifton R. Mus­
ser Professor Emeritus of Economics,
was the McCorkle Visiting Lecturer at
The University of Virginia Law
School in early November. Besides
presenting the McCorkle Lecture, on
the topic "Blackmail," during his
three-day visit Mr. Coase had lunches
with faculty and students, attended
classes, and took part in seminar dis­
cussions. A banquet in his honor was
held in Jefferson's Rotunda, now
restored to its original splendor.
David P. Currie, Harry N. Wyatt
Professor of Law, made two trips on
behalf of the United States Informa­
tion Agency to speak about the Consti­
tution. In June he went to Germany,
where he spoke in nine different cities
on several topics, with particular
emphasis on judicial review in Ger-
David P. Currie
many and the United States. In Sep­
tember, he traveled to Nigeria and
Liberia, where he tried to develop the
theme of what makes a free constitu­
tion work.
Last summer, Richard A. Epstein,
James Parker Hall Professor of Law,
spent three weeks at Colorado College
in Colorado Springs, co-teaching a
three-week seminar for law school fac­
ulty on the "Genius of the Constitu­
tion" with Professor Timothy Fuller of
the Colorado College. The seminar
examined in detail the writings of
major philosophers who influenced the
design of the Constitution-Hobbes,
Harrington, Locke, Hume, and Mon­
tesquieu-the Federalists and the
Antifederalists, and key opinions of the
Supreme Court from its founding to
the end of the Marshall era. On Sep­
tember 6, Mr. Epstein took part in a
panel discussion on "The Rule of
Law" at the American Political Sci­
ence Association in Chicago. A few
days later, he traveled to Indianapolis
to another panel discussion at the
Mont Pelerin Society. The topic this
time was "Self-interest and the Consti­
tution." In early October he spoke on
a panel of the Constitutional Law Sec­
tion of the American Association of
Law Schools in Washington, D. C., on
the subject of "Why the Revolution of
1937 Was a Mistake." Mr. Epstein
gave a speech on "The Proper Scope of
the Commerce Clause" at the Social
Policy and Philosophy Center at
Bowling Green, Ohio, on October 23.
The same center sponsored a confer-
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ence on Capitalism and Socialism on
November 19 in Miami, Florida, at
which Mr. Epstein gave a talk entitled
"Luck." On December 5, he took part
in the University of Chicago Legal
Forum's symposium on AIDS and
Employer Testing and attended the
annual conference of the American
Economic Association in Chicago on
December 29.
Richard A. Epstein
Richard H. Helmholz, Ruth Wyatt
Rosenson Professor of Law and Direc­
tor of the Legal History Program, par­
ticipated in a panel on "Recurring
Themes in Legal History" at the
annual meeting of the American Soci­
ety for Legal History, held in Philadel­
phia on October 22-24. He presented
a paper on the history of the English
civil lawyers during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries at a meeting
held at the University of Arizona,
October 29-31. Mr. Helmholz served
as convenor of a group of German,
American, Scottish, and Irish scholars
investigating the history of the canon
law in Protestant countries after the
Reformation. The first meeting was
held in Bad Homburg, West Germany,
on November 5-6.
James D. Holzhauer, Assistant Pro­
fessor of Law, attended a workshop on
the History of American Labor Law,
sponsored by the Institute for Legal.
Studies and held at Georgetown Law
School on June 10. On November 12,
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he spoke on "Visions and Verity: Rec­
onciling the Dreams and Ideals that
Lead One to the Law with the Reali­
ties of Law Practice," in the "JurisDic­
tion" lecture series sponsored by Brent
House, the Episcopal center at the
University of Chicago. In December
he presented a paper entitled "Hyste­
ria or Reality? Adjudicative Factfind­
ing and the 'War on Drugs'" at the
University of Chicago Legal Forum's
third annual symposium on Testing in
the Workplace. Later in December he
testified before the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives, on H.R. 2664, the
Corporate Criminal Liability Bill
of 1987.
In June, Spencer L. Kimball, Sey­
mour Logan Professor of Law, partici­
pated in a meeting in Chicago of the
National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, in particular as a
member of the Board of the Journal of
Insurance Regulation. He attended a
similar meeting in Phoenix, Arizona,
in December. InJuly, he took part in a
confer:ence of the British Insurance
Law Association in London. While in
London, he also attended meetings as
a member of the Presidential Council
of the International Association of
Insurance Law. In August, he went to
South Africa for a month, where he
presented the Prestasi lectures to audi­
ences at Rand Afrikaans University in
Johannesburg, Stellenbosch Univer­
sity in Stellenbosch, near Capetown,
and the University of Natal in Dur­
ban. The lectures were sponsored by
Prestasi Brokers, South Africa's largest
independent insurance brokerage
Spencer L. Kimball
firm. Mr. Kimball gave two separate
lectures on the torts-insurance "crisis"
in the United States. The lectures will
be published in English in 7jdskrif vir
die Suid-AJrikaanse Reg (journal oj South
African Law). During his trip, Mr.
Kimball also participated in informal
seminars and discussions with faculty,
judges, and insurance practitioners.
Philip B. Kurland, Professor of
Law and William R. Kenan, Jr., Dis­
tinguished Service Professor in the
College, gave a speech on "Liberty" at
the Association of American Law
Librarians' annual meeting in Chi­
cago onJuly 6. OnJuly 23, he spoke to
the University of Maryland Graduate
School Symposium on "Constitutional
Origins." On September 13, he
attended a 43rd Ward Democratic
Party meeting and spoke on "Judicial
Appointments." Mr. Kurland testified
at the hearings on the nomination of
Robert H. Bork (J. D. '53) to the
Supreme Court. On September 25, he
spoke to the Commercial Club of Chi­
cago on Original Constitutional Prin­
ciples. In October, he gave a speech
entitled "Constitutional Tripos" to the
University of Chicago Service League.
On November 6, Mr. Kurland spoke
on Individual Rights at the School of
Philosophy of the Catholic University
in Washington, D. C.
John H. Langbein, Max Pam Pro­
fessor of American and Foreign Law,
received the Helmut Coing Fellowship
from the Henkel Stiftung of the Fed­
eral Republic of Germany to support
the legal historical research work that
he undertook in archives and rare
book collections in Germany and
England during the summer. Mr.
Langbein and Professor Daniel Fischel
are coauthors of a paper dealing with
the shortcomings of ERISA fiduciary
law. Mr. Langbein presented the paper
at workshops at Columbia Law School
on November 10, Yale Law School on
November 19 (with Mr. Fischel), and
Virginia Law School on December 11.
The National Conference of Commis­
sioners on Uniform State Laws has
named Mr. Langbein one of the
reporters for a project to revise Article
VI of the Uniform Probate Code,
which treats nonprobate transfers. The
new project envisions extending non-
probate "transfer on death" registra­
tions from bank accounts, as allowed at
present, to securities and mutual
funds. Mr. Langbein has been
appointed to the American Law Insti­
tute's Advisory Committee for the
Restatement of Trusts: Prudent Inves­
tor Rule, a project for revising trust
investment law to take account of
Modern Portfolio Theory. On Novem­
ber 4-5, Mr. Langbein participated in
an international colloquium on the
work and heritage of the German legal
scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny,
held at the University of California
(Berkeley) School of Law.
In late summer and early fall,
Michael W McConnell (J.n '79),
Assistant Professor of Law and Russell
Baker Scholar, devoted much time and
energy to supporting the nomination
of Robert Bork (LD, '53) to the United
States Supreme Court. During the
week before the hearings, he appeared
in an hour-long debate with Professor
Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law
School on public television. On Sep­
tember 22, he testified before the Sen­
ate Judiciary Committee, focusing on
Robert Bork's First Amendment rul­
ings. Mr. McConnell was also inter­
viewed on radio programs and wrote
analyses of the issues for newspapers
and other publications. On October 6,
Mr. McConnell gave a lecture on
"The Supreme Court and the Religion
Clauses" at a Notre Dame University
Law School function sponsored by the
Notre Dame Federalist Society. On
October 7, he spoke on the judicial
selection process before a meeting of
the American Federation of Small
Businesses. On December 10, he
spoke on "Creches on Public Property:
A New Christmas Tradition," at a
breakfast forum sponsored by the Cen­
ter for Church-State Studies at DePaul
University. On November 9, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted probable juris­
diction in Bowen v. Kendrick) an Estab­
lishment Clause case in which Mr.
McConnell represents a group of
intervening parents on a pro bono
basis. Oral arguments will take place
in April.
Bernard D. Meltzer (J.n '37), Dis­
tinguished Service Professor Emeri­
tus of Law, has become of Counsel to
the law firm of Sidley & Austin in
Chicago.
Geoffrey p. Miller, Professor of Law
and Associate Dean, spoke on Inde­
pendent Agencies to the Administra­
tive Law Section of the American Bar
Association in Washington, nc., on
October 10. He presented a paper on
"The True Story of Carolene Prod­
ucts" at the Law and Economics work­
shop at the University of Chicago on
October 13 and again at Stanford and
Berkeley Law and Economics work­
shops in early December. Mr. Miller
participated in a debate on the War
Powers Act before the Federalist Soci­
ety in Washington, nc., on Novem­
ber 6. He testified before the House
Small Business Committee on Corpo­
rate Takeovers on November 18.
Norval Morris
On June 12, Norval Morris, Julius
Kreeger Professor of Law and Crimi­
nology, gave the keynote speech at a
conference in Phoenix, Arizona, on
"Policing-State of the Art," spon­
sored by the National Institute of Jus­
tice. A second conference in this series,
"Residing in Criminal Court-State
of the Art," was held in Phoenix in
September and Mr. Morris was again
the keynote speaker. At the end of
June, he gave the opening speech at a
conference on legal sanctions in Mes­
sina, Sicily. On July 14, Mr. Morris
addressed the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York on the occasion
of ceremonies celebrating the Bicen­
tennial of the U.S. Constitution. His
speech was entitled "Crime and Pun­
ishment under the Constitution." In
August, he was comoderator, with Jus­
tice Harry A. Blackmun, at a seminar
on Justice and Society in Aspen, Colo­
rado, and also gave the Aspen Institute
Address, "Blacks and Crime in
America." At the end of that month,
Mr. Morris was appointed to the
Board of Directors of the Criminal
Justice Project of Cook County, Illi­
nois. He traveled to Washington,
nc., on October 24 to be the summa­
rizing speaker at the celebration of the
fifteenth year of the ACLU's National
Prison Project and spoke at a confer­
ence on the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the Model Penal Code of the Ameri­
can Law Institute in Camden, New
Jersey in early November. At the end
of that month he was appointed to and
attended the first meeting of the Advi­
sory Board to the Chicago Crime
Commission.
Gary H. Palm (J.n '67), Professor
of Law, attended the ABA National
Conference on Lawyer Competence,
Professional Skills, and Legal Educa­
tion in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on
October 15-18. He chaired the open­
ing panel of presentations entitled
"What Are Professional Skills? And
Why Whould Law Schools Teach
Them? " He also spoke on current
developments in clinical education and
skills instruction in law schools. Mr.
Palm has been appointed to serve as a
member of the Accreditation Commit­
tee of the ABA's Section on Legal Edu­
cation and Admissions to the Bar. On
January 7, he spoke at the Association
of American Law Schools' Section on
'Clinical Legal Education about "Con­
troversial Issues Arising from ABA
Review of Law Schools' Professional
Skills Programs," in Miami, Florida.
In September, Randall D. Schmidt
(j.D. '79), Staff Attorney and Clinical
Fellow, gave a presentation on prac­
ticing before the Illinois Department
of Human Rights at a seminar on
Employment Discrimination, spon­
sored by the Chicago chapter of the
National Lawyers Guild.
In September, Stephen J Schulho-
jer, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg
Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice,
gave the Jerome W. Sidel Memorial
Lecture at the tenth annual Constitu­
tional Conference at Washington Uni­
versity Law School in St. Louis. His
talk was entitled "The Constitution
and the Police: Individual Rights and
Law Enforcement." The conference
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was sponsored by the Washington Uni­
versity Law School and the American
Jewish Congress.
Geoffrey R. Stone (J.n '71), Harry
Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law and
Dean of the Law School, spoke to the
American Bar Association's Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities
on August 9 on "The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Calling Constitu­
tional Conventions." On November
16, he spoke to the Legal Club of Chi­
cago on "Original Intent and Consti­
tutional Interpretation.
"
David A. Strauss
David A. Strauss, Assistant Profes­
sor of Law, testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee in June on the
First Amendment implications of a bill
that would provide television networks
with a limited exemption from the
antitrust laws to enable them to con­
sider ways to curb televised violence.
In August, he conducted a workshop at
the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association on the relations
between federal and state courts. In
September, he spoke on Supreme
Court and appellate advocacy to the
Local Government Attorneys of Vir­
ginia. Back on the University of Chi­
cago campus, Mr. Strauss spoke on
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Legal Ethics and the Adversary
System at Brent House, the Univer­
sity's Episcopalian church center. In
December, he addressed the annual
meeting of the National League of
Cities on civil rights law. Mr. Strauss
has been elected to a second consecu­
tive term as a member of the Board of
Governors of the Chicago Council of
Lawyers.
Cass Sunstein, Professor of Law and
Professor in the Department of Politi­
cal Science and the College, spoke to
the Washington, ne., Bar Associa­
tion in June on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution. In July, he spoke at the
Cambridge Lectures, sponsored by
Canadian judges and held at Cam­
bridge University, on the problem of
affirmative rights under the United
States Constitution. Later in July, he
traveled to Munich, Germany, to
speak on the relation between the
founding period and the New Deal, as
part of the German celebration of the
Bicentennial of the Constitution. In
September, he spoke on two panels at
the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association. His first
talk was entitled "Deliberative Democ­
racy after the New Deal," the second
involved republicanism and the consti­
tutional founding. He spoke before the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
on Robert Bork's views on the separa­
tion of powers. In November, Mr. Sun­
stein gave a paper on proportional
representation at a conference, "After
the Bicentennial," at Georgetown
University Law Center. He attended a
conference in Washington, D. e., on
judging and judicial ethics and in
December he gave a paper, "Beyond
the Republican Revival," at the legal
theory workshop at McGill University.
The paper will be published in the
July, 1988 issue of the Yale Law Journal.
During the summer of 1987, Diane
P. Wood, Assistant Professor of Law,
completed her portion of the project to
revise the U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations. On August 10, in connec­
tion with the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association, she spoke
to a committee on the progress of the
revision of the International Guide­
lines. She was appointed co-chair of
the International Antitrust Committee
in the ABA Section of International
Law and Practice. On September 16,
Ms. Wood gave a talk on antitrust
aspects of international joint ventures
in San Francisco, to a seminar spon­
sored by the World Trade Institute. On
October 12, with two other law profes­
sor "alumni," she participated in a
panel discussion at her former law
firm, Covington & Burling, on the
perceived decline in lawyer profession­
alism and what law schools are and
should be doing about it. On October
22, Ms. Wood presented a paper to the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute
program on "North American and
Common Market Antitrust Law."
Her topic was governmental involve­
ment and international antitrust
enforcement. The Fall Meeting of the
ABA's International Law and Practice
Section, held on November 13 in New
Orleans, explored all legal aspects of a
hypothetical international business
transaction. At the meeting Ms. Wood
delivered a paper on antitrust and
antiboycott issues.
In October, Hans Zeisel, Professor
Emeritus of Law and Sociology, par­
ticipated in a conference on "Expelled
Reason" (the Hitler emigration) in
Vienna, Austria. He spoke about Karl
Polanyi, the late economist, and also
made a statement on the devastating
role of President Waldheim of Austria.
The statement was broadcast by Aus­
trian Television on the day comme­
morating the foundation of the second
Austrian republic. On December 2,
Mr. Zeisel gave a talk before the
Illinois Academy of Criminology on
"What Determines Sentences?"
Visiting Professor Wages
Legal War on Pornography
and Sexism
The conviction in Catharine MacKin­
non's voice leaves little doubt that if
she has anything to do with it, pornog­
raphy will someday be illegal in this
country.
"We expect to win," MacKinnon
said. "We actually will win legally,
eventually. But I think, as always with
major forms of social change, there
will be a legal, political, and social level
to it. "
MacKinnon played a major legal
role, with feminist author Andrea
Dworkin, in efforts to establish anti­
pornography ordinances in Minneap­
olis and Indianapolis. The ordinances
defined pornography as sex discrimi­
nation and, therefore, as a violation of
women's civil rights. Although both
were passed by the respective city
councils, the mayor vetoed the Minne­
apolis ordinance and the Supreme
Court allowed to stand a lower court
judgement that said the Indianapolis
ordinance was contrary to freedom of
speech.
MacKinnon's antipornography
efforts, along with her precedent­
setting legal work in the 1970s in sex­
ual harassment, have earned her
national recognition as an attorney,
feminist, and activist.
She was a visiting professor at the
Law School during the winter quarter
and taught the course "Sex Discrimi­
nation." The lines of those waiting to
speak to her outside her Law School
office indicate that she is a popular
teacher with students, and the feeling
is evidently mutual.
"The students here are wonderful, "
said MacKinnon. "I have to say they
are the best students I have eve; had in
every way. They are well-prepared,
responsive, thoughtful, articulate, and
diverse, with a wide range of views.
They are creative, concerned and
extremely intelligent.
"
MacKinnon earns praise, as well,
from other legal scholars. "She is
American legal feminism," said Mary
Becker, Professor of Law at the Uni­
versity of Chicago. "Anyone doing
anything in terms of legal feminism is
either doing something not very good
or is doing something that is derivative
of MacKinnon. She has set the frame­
work and the agenda."
Besides the Indianapolis and Min­
neapolis ordinances, MacKinnon has
also been involved in such celebrated
struggles as ..... the case of Michelle
Vinson, a black woman raped over a
period of several years by a superior at
work. MacKinnon wrote the Supreme
Court brief that established sexual
harassment as sex discrimination in a
unanimous decision in her case.
MacKinnon's writings, including
her provocative review of Jane
Mansbridge's "Why We Lost the
ERA" in the Spring 1987 issue of the
University of Chicago Law Review, result
in responses ranging from hearty
endorsement to vehement disagree­
ment, even among other feminists.
Her most recent book, Feminism Unmo­
dified, represents an "attempt to create
a theory for women that is on women's
own terms and not a subsidiary theory
of pre-existing theories," she said.
"It seems to me that the feminisms
we are currently in receipt of, although
they all contain an authentic feminist
impulse, are subsidiary theories of lib­
eralism or socialism. They are basi­
cally liberalism or Marxism applied to
women. I am saying that is not the
same thing as feminism, without mod­
ification. In other words, not liberal
feminism, not socialist feminism, but
plain feminism-feminism on its own
terms: feminism unmodified."
The book, a collection of speeches
MacKinnon gave from 1981 to 1986,
argues that gender as a system is a
social construct, central to which is
male dominance and violence. Por­
nography, MacKinnon's book argues,
is key to women's subordination
because it eroticizes male dominance,
making it seem somehow natural.
MacKinnon also criticizes liberal femi­
nism for urging a type of equality that
has been defined in male terms and is
"antithetical to what women have
learned and gained." Many supposed
gains for women-argued under this
concept of equality-have actually
benefited only selected women whose
situations are most like those of men,
and men themselves, MacKinnon
said.
"My work has a lot of elements that
combine to produce varying re­
sponses," she said. "There is a deep
methodological critique and there is an
activist posture. By the methodological
critique, people feel like I'm pulling
the rug out from under them. In terms
of the activist posture, they feel that my
relationship to the world and the real­
ity of my work in the world is some
kind of reproach to them.
"I think probably more important,
however, is the substance that my work
treats, and in particular, the critique of
male dominance and male violence."
MacKinnon added. "The idea is that
sexual violence is systemic and not
exceptional, and that those things that
men like to think of as marginal, like
pornography, are in fact central to a
system that has privileged them and in
which they participate on a daily basis
and from which they benefit. "
Cass Sunstein, Professor of Law,
believes that, in years to come, MacK­
innon will be seen as one of the most
important legal scholars of this period.
"She reminds me a lot of New Deal
proponents who were protesting the
treatment of workers or of civil right
activists during the '60s protesting the
treatment of blacks," he said. "What
they were saying, in retrospect, seems
kind of obvious. At the time, much of
what they were saying seemed radical.
MacKinnon is in this tradition. "
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Dean Stone Meets Alumni
During summer and fall last year,
Dean Geoffrey Stone continued the
series of visits he had begun before he
assumed the office of Dean, traveling
to cities around the country to meet
with alumni and discuss the Law
School.
On August 6, he spoke to a lunch­
time gathering of alumni in Seattle.
Gail Runnfeldt (J.D. '79), president of
the Seattle chapter, organized the
event, which attracted a quarter of the
alumni living in the area. The next
day, Dean Stone spoke to alumni in
Portland, at a luncheon organized by
the president of the Portland chapter,
Richard Botteri (J.D. '71).
On September 15, New York
alumni and friends gathered at a
luncheon arranged by Douglas Kraus
(J.D. '73), president of the New York
chapter, at the offices of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
Because of the heightened interest in
the Supreme Court, Dean Stone spoke
on "The Rehnquist Court: Reflections
on Overruling the Warren Court,"
rather than on the state of the Law
School.
October 19, the day of the Great
Crash, had its minor disasters for the
Law School too. Dean Stone was to
have traveled to Pittsburgh for a lunch­
time talk but missed the plane because
of an accident on the freeway that
blocked traffic and prevented him
from reaching the airport. Un­
daun ted, Daniel Booker (J. D. '71),
who hosted the luncheon at his firm
of Reed Smith Shaw & McClay,
arranged a telephone link so that Dean
Stone could give his talk on "The Law
School-Past, Present and Future"
over a speakerphone. The audience
showered Dean Stone with questions
after the talk, which he found very
reassuring after speaking for forty
minutes into a silent phone.
The St. Louis chapter, led by its
president, Henry Mohrman (J.D. '73),
38 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD
Law School Archive­
Help Wanted
One person's junk is another's
antique, as the saying goes. Or in this
case, some,�qe �!se's archive. I: ��uhave any memorabilia from the Law
School-scripts of old skits, posters,
photographs, cartoons, first editions,
letters, signed footballs, paintings,
anything-that are gathering dust in
your attic or basement, please don't
throw them out. Send them to the Law
School.
Last springHin the course of creating
an exhibit On the history of the Law
School's buildings, in preparation for
the dedication of the Law School's
extension, the staff of the D'Angelo
Law Library discovered that there are
enormous gaps in material relating to
the Law School's history. For several
years,.Judith Wright, the Law Libra.f;­
ian, has wanted to create a formal
archive of Law School material, but
until now there has been no space to
house such a collection. The extension
of the D'Angelo Law Library building
has now provided the opportunity to
create an archive that will preserve the
heritage and traditions of the Law
School.
Cap and Gown yearbook for 1911 donated I?Y Dorothy Levitan, widow of Moses
Levitan tj.o. )13).
Some materials already exist. The
library maintains collections of the
scholarly writings of faculty and
alumni. These are housed in the Louis
H. Silver Special Collections Room,
along with the rare book collection.
Although thesesworks present a stun­
ning history of die intellectual life and
achievements of members of the Law
School, a collection that ignores the
physical and social setting of the insti­
tution is woefully incomplete. A few
important documents relating to the
early history of the Law School are
housed in the Special Collections
department of the Joseph Regenstein
Library. Now that we have space, we
can start collecting materials from the
present-tomorrow's history-but to
fill in some of the gaps, we turn to you,
our alumni. If you have anything at all
that relates to the Law School, however
ephemeral it trial;f;.:seem, and you don't
want to keep it for your own memories,
please send it to Judith Wright. Her
phone number, for queries, discus­
sions, or to warn her that vanloads of
material are arriving, is 3121702-9616.
The address is, of course, The Univer­
sity of Chicago Law School, D'Angelo
Law Library, 1111 E. 60th Street, Chi­
cago, IL 60637.
For the Class 011911
attended a luncheon on November 3
and heard Dean Stone speak on "The
Law School-Past, Present, and
Future." About 22 percent of alumni
in the area attended the event.
Dean Stone gave the same talk to
alumni in Detroit on November 30, at
a luncheon organized by Miles (JD.
'50) and DavidJaffe (JD. '81) at their
firm, Honigman Miller Schwartz &
Cohn. Questions after the talk devel­
oped into an extended discussion of
affirmative action issues in the context
of the Law School.
On December 8, Dean Stone flew to
Minneapolis-St. Paul where he spoke
about the Law School at an alumni
luncheon organized by Duane
Krohnke (JD. '66), president of the
Minneapolis-St. Paul chapter. Twenty­
five percent of the alumni living in the
area attended the event.
Looking back over 1987, Dean
Stone summed up: "It has been an
interesting experience to visit with our
graduates in some sixteen cities and to
share with them the latest news about
the Law School. I have especially
enjoyed the opportunity to exchange
ideas for the future. I hope many of
our alumni will return to Chicago
next month to visit with us at the
Annual Dinner and the various class
. "
reunions.
Events around the Country
Professor Richard Epstein spoke to
alumni at a luncheon in Los Angeles
arranged in conjunction with the Cali­
fornia State Bar Association meetings.
Mr. Epstein, who was introduced by
Joel Bernstein (JD. '69), president of
the Los Angeles chapter, spoke on
"Economic Liberties and the Consti­
tution-California Style."
On November 3, alumni in Phila­
delphia enjoyed a lunchtime talk enti­
tled "Cheating and Bribing: The
Things Some People Will Do to Get
into the Law School," by Richard
Badger (JD. '68), Assistant Dean for
Admissions and Dean of Students.
The president of the the Philadelphia
chapter, Martin Wald (J.D. '64),
introduced Dean Badger to the audi­
ence. In his talk, Mr. Badger gave
examples of how applicants (and their
relatives) have tried over the years to
bribe or cheat their way into Chicago
and other law schools. Dean Badger
made it clear that his presentation was
not a workshop for the parents of pro­
spective applicants!
ABA Meeting
The American Bar Association's
annual meeting in San Francisco was
the setting for a reception for our
al�mni on August 10. One hundred
alumni and guests attended.
Opening Day Picnic
On September 27, as part of Orienta­
tion Week, the Law School hosted its
annual Opening Day picnic for new
and returning students and faculty.
This year, Dean Badger invited gradu­
ates who live in Hyde Park to bring
their families to the hamburger and
hot dog barbecue in the Law School
Courtyard.
Mandel Alumni Meet
The Mandel Legal Aid Clinic box
luncheon was held on November 2.
The event attracted graduates who had
participated in the Clinic's work and
the program in clinical legal education
during their Law School careers. Pro­
fessor Gary Palm (JD. '67), Director
of the Clinic, and the clinical fellows,
Jonathan Baum (JD. '80), Robert
Cohen (JD. '86), Randall Schmidt)
(JD. '79), and Anne Nicholson Weber,
together with the Clinic's social
worker, Paul Colson) discussed their
current work. BaUI� and Colson
announced a new program to enforce
the rights of Public Aid recipients
to meaningful job training and em­
ployment under Illinois' "Project
Chance." Schmidt, Cohen, and Palm
reported on the Clinic's latest efforts to
improve the procedures at the Illinois
Human Rights Department and to
expand the remedies available to vic­
tims of discrimination. Weber dis­
cussed the work to defend the Illinois
Affordable Budget Plan legislation
(helping indigent utility consumers to
maintain utility service) from constitu­
tional attacks in the Illinois appellate
courts.
Loop Luncheon Series a
Sell-Out
The Fall season of Loop Luncheons
was very successful. Over one hundred
alumni registered for each luncheon,
straining the capacity of the Board of
Trustees Room. So many graduates
wanted to hear Dean Geoffrey Stone
speak on "The Rehnquist Court:
Reflections on Overruling the Warren
Court" on September 22 that a repeat
of this luncheon meeting was arranged
on October 6 for those unable to be
accommodated at the original time.
Dean Geoffrey Stone talks with James
Parker Hall) .lr. and James Parker
Hall III at the September 22 Loop
Luncheon.
Anton Valukas, United States
Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois, gave a well-received talk on
, "Corruption in Chicago" on October
15. Such a controversial subject natu­
rally drew many questions, which Mr.
Valukas answered fully and candidly.
On November 18, Neil Bluhm,
President of the JMB Realty Corpora­
tion, gave the final talk in the fall
series, an excellent analysis of trends in
"The Current Real Estate Market. "
The Loop Luncheons are sponsored
by the Chicago chapter of the Law
School Alumni Association and are
usually held in the Board of Trustees'
Room at 2716 One First National
Plaza. Alan Orschel (JD. '64) is chair
of the Loop Luncheon Committee. If
you are interested in more information
about the luncheons or would like to
volunteer your services on the organiz­
ing committee, please contact Assist­
ant Dean Holly Davis (3121702-9628).
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Rob Spencer and Becky Owen
Rob Spencer in Lake George, New
York. Also in the wedding party were
Ruth Ernst, Mike Donohoe (just back
from an African safari) and Brad
Campbell.
Congrats to Lindley Brenza who has
landed a spot with the Supremes; he'll
be clerking for ChiefJustice Rehnquist
in 1988-89. Keungsuk Kim caught up
with former Bigelow Fellow Paul Yano­
witch who is now in D. C. , trying
asbestos cases for the Department of
Justice. Ira Belcove can now be found
at Mayer, Brown & Platt.
Jeremy Hobbs began 1988 with an
oral argument before a Seventh Cir­
cuit panel which included the Honor­
able Frank Easterbrook ('73).
Some of our classmates had an
impromptu reunion in New York City.
Josh Kanter; Steve Reiches, Ed Fuhr,
Beth Ehrenreich, Brenda Swierenga,
Glen Spear, and Mike Faber visited
with locals Peggy Schiller; Liora Coch,
and Carolyn Schurr.
Mike Donohoe ran into Liz Kutyla
while in Chicago over Thanksgiving;
she confessed that she and fellow Son­
nenschein associate Tracy Potter still
manage an occasional pilgrimage to
Jimmy's. Sam Ach and Jennifer
Nijman crossed paths while working
on an environmental matter for their
respective Chicago firms. Sheila Igoe
gets together with David Haselkorn in
Washington, D. c., and also with Mike
Faber, who was instrumental in orga­
nizing a multi-law firm holiday pro­
gram to help the city's homeless.
Tom Cooke enjoyed his post-Bar trip
to Europe but, alas, failed to meet up
with Beth Ehrenreich and Ed Fuhr
over there. He's now working NYC­
style hours in Cleveland, as is Rick
Friedman in San Francisco. Jerry Bur­
stein, on the other hand, is soaking up
the sun while practicing beachfront
property law in the Virgin Islands.
Greg Koltun gets together with
some of the L.A. crew regularly: Nick
Tell, Laura Fox, Rob Perry, Joe
Davidson (who lives on a boat in
Marina del Rey) , and Peggy Harari.
He has also seen San Francisco's Brad
Miller, Rick Friedman, Andrew
Miller; Enid Van Hoven (,86), James
Brock (,86), andJosh Pickus (,86).
Bumped into Andrew Smith (now
class of '88) while skating on Loch
Levi over New Year's; he's the master­
mind behind this year's Wine Mess
operation. Steve Tantillo reports that
Amy and Tom Spence are expecting
their first heir this spring.
I apologize for the inevitable mile­
stones I've missed. Please send me
your news and any photos!
DEATHS
The Law School Records notes with
sorrow the deaths of:
1927
Irving H. Goldberg
December 27, 1987
1931
Joseph M. Cody
January 5, 1988
1932
Irving B. Naiburg
September 24, 1987
1933
Joseph E. Tinkham
May, 1987
1935
Paul R. Kitch
October 24, 1987
1971
Richard A. Hudlin IV
January 28, 1988
Leo J. Carlin, 1895-1987
Lawyer and philanthropist, Leo
Carlin G.D. '19), died on November
17, 1987, only one month before his
ninety-second birthday. Born in Rus­
sia, Mr. Carlin emigrated to the
United States in 1901 and made Chi­
cago his lifelong home and the benefi­
ciary of sixty-seven years of legal and
civic service. A senior partner at the
law firm of Sonnenschein, Carlin,
Nath &. Rosenthal, where he practiced
real estate since his graduation, Mr.
Carlin devoted his intellect and
thoughtfulness to the legal profession,
his clients, and Chicago, working a full
five-day week into his ninety-first year.
Leo Carlin received a citation for
public service from the University of
Chicago in 1964. Among his many
gifts ito the University were a chair in
Jewish religious studies at the Divinity
School, a book fund in the Library and
a gift of rare books to the Law Library,
in addition to numerous other gifts of
personal property, including the mag­
nificent Oriental rug that hangs on the
LeoJ Carlin
wall of the main stairs leading to the
D'Angelo Law Library.
At his memorial service, it was said
of Mr. Carlin: he lived his life as if it
were his personal responsibility to
make this a better and more decent
world. He will be remembered as a
man who more than fulfilled his part.
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The Law School Visiting Committee
Chair
Ingrid L. Beall
' 56
Baker & McKenzie
Chicago, Illinois
Terms Expiring 1987-88
Donald E. Egan' 61
Katten Muchin Zavis Pearl
& Galler
Chicago, Illinois
Junjiro Tsubota '67
Tokyo Kokusai Law Offices
Tokyo, Japan
Oliver L. Holmes Jr. '73
Pettit & Martin
San Francisco, California
Lee A. Freeman, Sr.
Freeman Freeman &
Salzman, PC.
Chicago, Illinois
The Hon. Ann C. Williams
United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois
Chicago, Illinois
Anne Kimball '76
Wildman Harrold Allen &
Dixon
Chicago, Illinois
Morton H. Zalutsky '60
Salutsky Klarquist & Johnson, pc.
Portland, Oregon
Douglas Kraus '73
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
& Flom
New York, New YorkJack Fuller
Chicago Tribune
Chicago, Illinois
Barry L. Zubrow '80
Goldman Sachs & Company
New York, New York
Barbara W. Mather ' 68
Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz
Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaThe Hon. Douglas H.
Ginsburg' 73
United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit
Washington, D. C.
Terms Expiring 1988-89
Burton E. Glazov '63
JMB Realty
Chicago, Illinois
King V. Cheek Jr.
' 64
New York Institute of Technology
Old Westbury, New York
Ralph Neas '71
Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights
Washington, D. C.
Ruth Goldman' 47
Miller Shakman Nathan
& Hamilton
Chicago, Illinois
Charles Edwards '65
Rudnick & Wolfe
Chicago, Illinois
Gail L. Peek '84
Kirkland & Ellis
Chicago, Illinois
C. Curtis Everett '57
Bell Boyd & Lloyd
Chicago, Illinois
The Hon. Laurence Silberman
United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit
Washington, D. C.
David C. Hilliard '62
Pattishall McAuliffe &
Hofstetter
Chicago, Illinois
Gail P. Fels '65
Fels & Fels
Coral Gables, Florida
Saul 1. Stern' 40
Rockville, Maryland
L. Bates Lea
General Counsel, Amoco
Corporation
Chicago, Illinois
The Hon. Charles Fried
Department ofJustice
Washington, D. C.
The Hon. Deanell Tacha
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
Denver Colorado
Robert H. Mohlman' 41
Indianapolis, Indiana
The Hon. John Gibbons
United States Court of Appeals
Third Circuit
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
The Hon. Ralph Winter
United States Court of Appeals
Second Circuit
New York, New York
Claire E. Pensyl '78
Adams Fox Adelstein & Rosen
Chicago, Illinois
Laurence N. Strenger '68
BKS Company
New York, New York
Joseph H. Golant '65
Romney Golant Martin &
Ashen
Los Angeles, California
Terms Expiring 1989-90
Harry Tatelman
MeA Inc.
Universal City, California
James Granby '63
Granby Enterprises Inc.
San Diego, California
Jules-Marc Baudel '67
Baudel Sales Vincent & Georges
Paris, France
Richard Heise '61
Financial Place Corporation
Chicago, Illinois
Debra A. Cafaro '82
Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum
& Perlman
Chicago, Illinois
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John B. Davidson
Louis G. Davidson & Associates
Chicago, Illinois
Richard Fielding '73
Herbert C. Fielding Foundation
Inc.
New York, New York
Marshall Patner' 56
Law Offices of Marshall
Patner, P. C.
Chicago, Illinois
Roberta Cooper Ramo '67
Poole Tinnin Martin
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Aviva Futorian ' 70
Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
The Hon. Mary M.
Schroeder '65
United States Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit
Phoenix, Arizona
]ames Hormel ' 58
Equidex Inc.
San Francisco, California
Lawrence T. Hoyle Jr. '65
Hoyle Morris & Kerr
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
David S. Tatel
Hogan & Hartson
Washington, D. C.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland
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